No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl
Championship Series Stays In-Bounds
of the Sherman Act by Carroll, M. Todd
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 3 Article 5
Summer 6-1-2004
No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl
Championship Series Stays In-Bounds of the
Sherman Act
M. Todd Carroll
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports
Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
M. Todd Carroll, No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl Championship Series Stays In-Bounds of the
Sherman Act, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1235 (2004), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol61/iss3/5
No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl
Championship Series Stays In-Bounds
of the Sherman Act
M. Todd Carroll*
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................ 1236
II. College Football: An Overview of the Industry ......................... 1241
A. The Landscape of College Football Within the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ............................. 1241
B. The Relationship Between Conferences and the Bowls ....... 1247
C. Traditional Division I-A Postseason Inefficiencies .............. 1249
D. Enriching the Postseason: The Bowl Championship
Series ................................................................................... 1253
1. The Purposes, Procedures, and Results of the
Bowl Championship Series ........................................... 1253
2. Recent Challenges to the Bowl Championship
Series ............................................................................. 1257
III. The Sherman Act and Locating Unreasonable Restraints
of Trade ...................................................................................... 1258
A. Methods of Antitrust Analysis ............................................. 1259
1. The Traditional Tools: Per Se Violations, the Rule
of Reason, and the Quick Look ..................................... 1259
2. A Recent Trend: California Dental's Practical
A pproach ....................................................................... 1262
B. Choosing a Framework for Analysis .................................... 1263
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2005;
B.A., Furman University, 2002. 1 would like to thank all who provided their valuable insight on
this topic, including Messrs. Michael Denger and James Loftis and Dr. Jeffrey Yankow. I
would especially like to thank Mrs. Whitney Bouknight for generously giving her time and
support to this project. A special appreciation goes to my family and friends for their tireless
patience and ceaseless understanding throughout the note-writing process. All mistakes are my
own.
1235
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1235 (2004)
1. Identifying the Challenged Conduct Within
the Bowl Championship Series ..................................... 1264
2. Rejecting Per Se Treatment ........................................... 1265
IV. Evaluating the Competitive Effects of the Bowl
Cham pionship Series .................................................................. 1270
A. Alleged Anticompetitive Effects .......................................... 1270
B. Procompetitive Benefits and Justifications of
the Bowl Championship Series ............................................ 1272
1. Competitive Benefits to the Industry of
C ollege Football ............................................................ 1273
2. Benefits to Schools That Are Not Members
of the Bowl Championship Series ................... 1275
3. Consumer Preferences: An Additional Consideration
for the Reasonableness of the Bowl Championship
S eries ............................................................................. 1278
C. Dismissing Less-Restrictive Alternatives to the
Bowl Championship Series .................................................. 1282
D. Weighing the Competitive Effects of the Bowl
Cham pionship Series ........................................................... 1285
V . C onclusions ................................................................................ 1285
L Introduction
Who needs college football?' Given the rapidly increasing cost of
maintaining a football program, many colleges are asking this question.2 Since
the late 1980s, the average expenses generated by a Division I-A college
football team have nearly doubled to over $6 million,3 causing several schools
1. This question is posed in an advertisement produced by the University of Tennessee
that aired during the 2003-404 college football postseason. The spot portrays a student flutist
whose education has been financed with funds generated by the school's football program
University of Tennessee Promotional Advertisement (Entertainment & Sports Programming
Network (ESPN) television broadcast, Jan. 2,2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The advertisement further notes that the football program has contributed S1.5 million
to the school's academic sector between 1998 and 2003. Id.
2. See DANIEL L. FuuKs, REvENES AND ExPENsES oF DISION I AND II INTRCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETics PROGRAMS: FINANCIAL TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS-2001, at 22 (2002) (detailing the
rise in costs associated with football programs), available at http://www.ncaa.org (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Id.
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to question the viability of their programs.4 Revenues created by football,
though, can be substantial.5 Indeed, a financially successful football program
may fund itself and other athletic teams, thereby providing more students with
the opportunity to compete at the collegiate level and producing an athletic
program of an overall higher quality.6 Of more social consequence, profits
generated by football can also provide a windfall for funding a university's
academic programs.7 But not every college or university has the luxury of a
program that can stand on its own.8
Exponentially rising expenses have forced many schools to support their
football programs with funds from the general budget9 while others have
chosen to terminate football altogether.' 0 For those schools that decide to field
4. See, e.g., Scott Cowen, Editorial, How Division I-A is Selling Its Athletes Short, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2003, at 13 [hereinafter Cowen, Selling Athletes Short] (describing the
evaluation of the costs related to the Tulane University football program that the school's board
undertook when considering whether the program should continue).
5. See FULKS, supra note 2, at 22 (noting that the average revenue created by a Division
I-A football program in 2001 was $10.9 million).
6. See, e.g., Vince Dooley, Editorial, Other Opinion: Athletics Enhance Academics at
UGA, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 28, 2003, at 7G (explaining the use of football-generated
revenue to upgrade athletic facilities for both men's and women's sports).
7. See id. (noting that the University of Georgia athletic department, which is financed
primarily by the football program, has contributed $1.5 million in non-athletic scholarships to
the school with a commitment for an additional $500,000 to be paid before 2008).
8. See FuLKs, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that 79 Division I-A football programs, or
69%, reported a net profit following the 2001 season while 32, or 28%, reported a net deficit);
see also Welch Suggs, In Football, the Have-Nots Clash with the Haves, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Sept. 5, 2003, at A48 (juxtaposing the football program at the University of Colorado,
which "would still turn a profit" if it had to "carry all of the athletics department's capital debt,"
against Colorado State University's athletic department, which required nearly $5 million in
student fees and other general funds from the university in order to operate during the 2003-04
academic year). Mr. Suggs's article also noted that the University of Idaho's football program
"will spend $4-million more than it brings in [during the 2003-04 academic year], with the
university's general budget making up the shortfall." Id.
9. See, e.g., Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the
Bowl Championship Series: Oversight Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Scott Cowen, President, Tulane Univ.) (Sept. 4, 2003)
[hereinafter Cowen, House Statement] (noting that some schools must "scramble within their
own limited budgets" to finance football programs), available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/cowen090403.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Suggs, supra
note 8, at A48 (detailing the use of general funds, student fees, and state appropriations in order
to sustain the football programs at the Universities of Colorado State and Idaho).
10. See, e.g., Brian Ettkin, Siena Sacks its Football Program; Players Say They Were
Surprised by Decision, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Jan. 22, 2004, at C1 (noting that the
Universities of Siena, Canisius, Fairfield, and St. John's have dropped their football programs
since October of 2002 because of the investment needed to maintain a team); Elliot Teaford,
The Big East's Final Fling, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at DI0 (explaining that financial
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football teams dependent on university support, every dollar allocated to an
athletic department results in one less dollar available for the academic sector.
This dilemma forces administrators to choose between fulfilling the school's
academic mission, on the one hand, and satisfying alumni, students, and other
supporters who crave success in athletics on the other. Consequently, a
frequent problem presented to university decisionmakers is whether scarce
resources should be used to build classrooms, upgrade laboratories, and pay
professors, or if those resources are better used to buy shoulder pads, improve
weight rooms, and hire more coaches."
Instead of treating the choice between football and academics as a binary
one, some schools have approached the problem from a third angle. A group of
college presidents currently trapped in this financial vise has banded together to
circumvent the problem by blaming their football deficits on antitrust violations
committed by other schools. This group, known as the Presidential Coalition
for Athletics Reform (Presidential Coalition) and led by Tulane University
President Scott Cowen, takes particular issue with the Bowl Championship
Series (BCS).12 The BCS is an agreement among several football-sponsoring
conferences, four postseason bowl games, and one television network that
decides which eight schools will participate in those four college football games
at the conclusion of each season.'3 The financial rewards that the BCS
reasons required East Tennessee State University to terminate its football program following the
2003-04 season).
I. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (discussing the budgetary decision faced
by Tulane University regarding the distribution of funds to its football program); Cowen, Selling
Athletes Short, supra note 4, at 13 (describing the review of Tulane's football program before
deciding to continue to "siphon even more resources from the academic mission of [the]
university" in order to support the program).
12. See Scott S. Cowen, Letter to Non-BCS University Presidents, at http://coalition.
tulane.edu/letter nonbcs.shtml (June 12, 2003) (encouraging schools that are not part of the
BCS to "aggressively work to alter the BCS arrangement") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). A comprehensive list of the Presidential Coalition's membership, which consists
of approximately fifty Division I-A schools, can be found at Presidential Coalition for Athletics
Reform, Participants: Institutions, at http://coalition.tulane.edu/members-institutions.shtml
(last visited June 19, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See DENNIS POPPE, NCAA 2003-04 POSTSEASON FOOTBALL HANDBOOK 8-9 (2003)
(describing the agreement that determines which schools will participate in the Rose Bowl,
Nokia Sugar Bowl, FedEx Orange Bowl, and Tostitos Fiesta Bowl games at the conclusion of
each college football season), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/handbooks/football/
2003/2003-04_dla_postseason.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
conferences that are parties to the BCS agreement include the Atlantic Coast Conference, the
Big East Conference, the Big Ten Conference, the Big Twelve Conference, the Pacific Ten
Conference, and the Southeastern Conference. Id. at 8. The television network involved in the
BCS is the American Broadcasting Company (ABC). Bowl Championship Series, BCS
Members, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/members.shtmi (last visited June 19, 2004) [hereinafter
1238
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generates are substantial-over $100 million from the four bowl games are
distributed annually among Division I-A conferences' 4 -but the schools
represented by the Presidential Coalition have not been the primary
beneficiaries of its fruits.15 As a result, the group has threatened to challenge
the arrangement as one that unreasonably restrains trade in violation of federal
antitrust legislation.'
6
In the fall of 2003, the Presidential Coalition took its first steps toward an
attempted dissolution of the BCS. The group appeared before the judiciary
committees of both the United States Senate and House of Representatives and
encouraged each to take a hard stance against the BCS. 17 Arguing that the
agreement amounts to little more than an unlawful group boycott by so-called
"BCS conferences" against "non-BCS conferences,"' 8 the Presidential Coalition
claimed that the schools it represents would be placed at an insurmountable
competitive disadvantage if the BCS remains unregulated.' 9 Though the
BCS, BCS Members] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2002-03 Distribution of BCS Revenue, at
http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/postseason_football/BCSrevenue.pdf (Apr. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter NCAA, 2002-03 BCS Revenue Distribution] (noting that the BCS distributed
nearly $115 million generated during the 2002-03 postseason among all Division I-A
conferences and some Division I-AA conferences) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
15. See id. (listing the BCS-created funds received by each conference). Conferences that
are part of the BCS agreement received between $16.6 million and $21.5 million for their
participation in the 2002-03 postseason, while non-BCS conferences received less than $1
million each. Id.
16. See Liz Clarke, Have-Nots' Want a Slice of the BCS Pie; Eleven I-A Presidents to
Hear Proposalfor Sharing Bowl Spoils With 'Mid-Majors', WASH. POsT, Nov. 16,2003, at E 15
(noting that the Presidential Coalition has retained counsel in preparation of an antitrust
challenge to the BCS).
17. See id. (noting that both judiciary committees held hearings "on the fairness of the
BCS"). The organization first met with the House of Representatives subcommittee on
September 4, 2003. United States H.R., Full Committee, at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
full.htm (last visited June 19, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee occurred on October 29, 2003. United States
Sen., All Hearings, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/scheduleall.cftn (last visited June 19, 2004)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See BCS or Bust: Competitive and Economic Effects of the Bowl Championship
Series On and Off the Field: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Scott Cowen, President, Tulane Univ.) [hereinafter Cowen, Senate
Statement] (expressing a belief that "the BCS is an anticompetitive and highly exclusive
system"), available at http://coalition.tulane.edu/testimony3.pdf (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (stating that the BCS effectively
prohibits non-BCS schools from participating in the four BCS bowl games).
19. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (listing adverse impacts of the BCS on
student recruitment, retention of coaches, facility improvement, scheduling, and the public
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federal legislators seemed to agree with the position of President Cowen's
group,2 the hearings concluded with a general understanding that Congress
would not take remedial steps until the Presidential Coalition exhausted its
alternatives to legislative intervention, the primary alternative being an
antitrust suit.
2'
This Note explains why an antitrust challenge to the BCS would be
unsuccessful. Reading the agreement in the context of the industry as a
whole, particularly in light of the history of college football's conference
and postseason structure, makes it clear that the arrangement does not
restrain trade unreasonably. 22 On the contrary, the agreement generates a
product-a postseason game between the nation's two best college football
teams-that was heretofore created only by coincidence.23 This result was
rarely available prior to the BCS despite consumer demand for such a
24game. Moreover, the BCS does not necessarily prevent schools that were
not privy to the agreement from participating in the four BCS games.25 A
further procompetitive benefit of the BCS is the infusion of an objective
measure of each college football team's relative strength into a system that
formerly based a team's value solely on the opinions of journalists and
coaches.2 6 This Note argues that the totality of these considerations
suffices to relieve the BCS of any liability under the Sherman Act.27
perception of non-member schools).
20. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, Bowl-Game System Gets Penalty Flag; Tulane President,
Some in Senate Seek to Revise College Football Policy, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, LA),
Oct. 30, 2003, at I (noting Sen. Joseph Biden's comments that the BCS looks "un-American,"
"unfair," and "like a rigged deal").
21. See id. (explaining that Congress would delay intervening in order to give all parties
an opportunity to resolve the situation); see also Clarke, supra note 16, at E 15 (noting that the
Presidential Coalition is preparing itself for possible antitrust litigation concerning the BCS).
22. See infra Part IV (analyzing the pro- and anticompetitive effects of the BCS on the
industry of college football).
23. See infra Part II.D (noting that the nation's two best teams will necessarily play one
another after the regular season pursuant to the terms of the BCS agreement).
24. See infra Part II.C (explaining the split national championships that accompanied the
traditional means of selecting college football's top team).
25. See POPPE, supra note 13, at 8-9 (describing how schools from non-BCS conferences
may become eligible or automatically qualify for a BCS game). Each season, one-quarter of the
BCS slots are available to schools outside of the BCS. Id. at 8; see also infra Part II.D
(discussing how each position in the BCS games is filled).
26. See infra Parts I.C-D (explaining the BCS formula and noting that it provides an
objective determination of which schools had the most successful college football seasons).
27. See infra Parts IV.B-C (describing the impact that procompetitive effects of the BCS
have on the antitrust analysis).
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To this end, the Note is organized as follows: Part II investigates the industry
of college football by describing the organization of Division I-A college football
and the difficulties that often prevented ending the season with a competition
between its two best teams prior to 1998.28 This Part then details the BCS
arrangement, including how teams qualify to participate in a BCS game and the
financial rewards that a conference receives from having a BCS participant.29 Part
I concludes with a discussion of recent challenges brought against the arrangement
by schools whose representation in a BCS bowl game is not guaranteed.30 Part II
begins the antitrust analysis and includes a general overview of antitrust
jurisprudence.3' Selecting the proper standard ofreview is particularly important to
the evaluation, and this Part argues that only a thorough rule of reason analysis is
sufficient. 32 Part lV then dissects the competitive effects of the BCS by weighing its
alleged anticompetitive results against its procompetitive benefits.33 The Note
concludes that the procompetitive benefits of the BCS substantially outweigh any
ancillary harm it might inflict upon competition.34 The remainder of the Note
discusses why less-restrictive alternatives to the BCS are neither available nor
desirable, thereby completing the antitrust analysis and concluding that the
agreement complies with applicable antitrust legislation.35
11 College Football: An Overview of the Industry
A. The Landscape of College Football Within the National
Collegiate Athletic Association
Nearly every facet of intercollegiate athletic competition is govemed by the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), an organization composed of
28. See infra Parts II.A-C (explaining the postseason format of Division I-A college
football and inefficiencies present within the system prior to the BCS).
29. See infra Part ll.D. I (discussing the formula used by the BCS to determine which
teams will play in the four BCS bowl games).
30. See infra Part II.D.2 (describing the recent challenges to the BCS pressed by the
Presidential Coalition).
31. See infra Part II.A (discussing general principles of antitrust analysis).
32. See infra Part III.B (selecting the rule of reason as the proper framework for analyzing
the BCS).
33. See infra Parts IV.A-B (evaluating the effects of the BCS on competition within
college football).
34. See infra Part IV.B (concluding that the procompetitive effects of the BCS are greater
than any harms created by the agreement).
35. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the unavailability of less-restrictive alternatives to the
BCS in shaping the Division I-A postseason).
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over 1200 colleges and universities that sponsors numerous sports and competitions
annually.3 6 The Association divides schools into three tiers with each division
reflecting, among other things, the number of sports its members sponsor and the
composition of each member's schedule." At the core of this delineation, however,
is the financial commitment that each tier's members put into their athletic
programs.3 1 The schools that devote the highest allocation of their resources to
athletics comprise Division 1.39
Not surprisingly, football is the NCAA-regulated sport that is both the
most costly for a school to fund and the largest generator of revenue.40 In
1978, because of the high costs associated with supporting a football
program, the NCAA split football-sponsoring Division I schools further
into Division I-A and Division I-AA. 4' There are two primary distinctions
between these divisions. The first is a requirement that each Division I-A
school must satisfy minimum attendance figures in order to maintain its status
36. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2003-04 NCAA DIvIsIoN I MANUAL § 1.2
(2003) (listing the association's fundamental purposes), available at http://www.ncaa.org/
library/membership/division i manual/2003-04/2003-04 dl manual.pdf (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Currently, 1266 institutions are NCAA members. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Composition of the NCAA, at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
membershipsvcs/membership breakdown.html (Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter NCAA,
Composition] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, What's the Difference Between Divisions I, II, &
II?, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/divcriteria.html (last visited June 19, 2004) [hereinafter
NCAA, Difference Between Divisions] (explaining the distinctions among the three NCAA
divisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Division I schools must sponsor
at least fourteen teams, including seven women's teams, and must play all of their minimum
contests against other Division I schools. Id. Division 1I schools must field at least four teams
each for men and women athletes, but, unlike Division I, there are no scheduling requirements
for sports other than football and basketball. Id. Division III is designed for schools that place
a primary emphasis on student participation in athletics, and member institutions must therefore
sponsor at least ten teams, including five women's teams. Id. In contrast to Division II, this
elevated requirement is designed to "maximiz[e] the number and variety of athletics
opportunities available to students." Id.
38. See id. (noting differences in how institutions within each division finance their
athletic departments). Both Divisions I and II place limits on financial aid awards available to
athletes. Id. Division III, on the other hand, does not permit schools to award athletic
scholarships. Id.
39. See id. (requiring only Division I schools to maintain minimum financial aid awards
for student-athletes).
40. See Fuucs, supra note 2, at 22 (noting that the average Division I-A football program
was responsible for 56% of expenses and 69% of revenues for its school's athletic department).
41. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, History of the NCAA, at http://www.ncaa.org/
bout/history.html (last visited June 19, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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in the division.42 Membership in I-AA does not impose a similar condition.
During the 2003-04 season, 117 schools met Division I-A's eligibility
requirements.43 Of these, all but four further distributed themselves into eleven
regional athletic conferences." Schools organize themselves into conferences
for efficiency in scheduling, fundraising, and other administrative tasks
associated with collegiate athletic programs. 45 Beyond providing these benefits
42. See NCAA, Difference Between Divisions, supra note 37 (detailing an elaborate series
of attendance requirements in order to retain Division I-A status, including an average
attendance of at least 17,000 spectators at all home games or seating capacity of at least 30,000
in the school's home football stadium, among other ways of meeting the requirement).
43. NCAA, Composition, supra note 36. There are eighty-six Division I schools that do
not sponsor football. Id.
44. See 2003-2004 NCAA Football, Division I-A, I-AA Conferences, at http://
ncaafootball.net/0,5717, 1_125_0_4585,00.html (last visited June 19, 2004) (listing the eleven
conferences in Division I-A) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The eleven
conferences are: the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big Twelve Conference, the Big East
Conference, the Big Ten Conference, Conference USA, the Mid-American Conference, the
Mountain West Conference, the Pacific Ten Conference, the Southeastern Conference, the Sun
Belt Conference, and the Western Athletic Conference. Id.
The Naval Academy, Troy State University, the University of Connecticut, and the
University of Notre Dame were not members of a conference for the 2003-04 season. 2003-
2004 NCAA Football, Division I-A Independents, at http://ncaafootball.net/0,5717,1
125_0 44538,00.htmrd (last visited June 19, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). This small number of schools is indicative of a trend in collegiate athletics for schools
to join these associations. Compare the current distribution to that of the 1990 season. For that
season, twenty-five Division I-A schools were not aligned with a conference. See DON
HEI IMCH'S COLLEGE FOOTBALL ANNUAL 1990, at 33, 41 (Shane O'Neill ed., 1990) (listing all
Division I-A schools that were independent of any conference). By 1992, only fifteen schools
remained independent. See DoN HEINRICH'S COLLEGE FOOTBALL ANNUAL 1992, at 63 (Shane
O'Neill ed., 1992) (same). Schools continue to leave the ranks of the independents, as the
University of Connecticut will participate as a member of the Big East Conference for the 2004-
05 football season. UNIV. OF CONN., UConn and the Big East Conference, in 2003 UNIv. OF
CONN. MEDIA GUIDE 10, at http://www.uconnhuskies.com/sports/MFootball/2004/
MediaGuide/l 0-11 -BIGEAST.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). Likewise, Troy State University will compete as a member of the Sun Belt
Conference beginning with the 2005-06 football season. See Sun Belt Conference, Sun Belt
Conference History, at http://www.sunbeltsports.org/info/history (last visited June 19, 2004)
(noting that Troy State will compete in all league sports beginning with the 2005-06 academic
year) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Further, the University of Notre
Dame is a signatory to the BCS agreement despite not having membership in any conference.
See BCS, BCS Members, supra note 13 (noting that Notre Dame is an "independent member" of
the BCS). Because of the relatively small number of teams that are not affiliated with a
conference or the BCS, this group of schools will not have any distinct impact on the antitrust
analysis and, therefore, will not be specifically accounted for in Part IV's discussion.
45. See, e.g., Welch Suggs, Wave of Indecision: As Tulane U. Struggles with the Cost of
Sports, Officials Weigh the Unthinkable, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 13, 2003, at A39
(noting that conferences will contract with television firms for the broadcasting rights to games
involving their members); Atlantic Coast Conference, ACC Properties, at http://theacc.
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to member institutions, a conference independently determines the format in
which its respective schools will compete against one another and how its
champion will be decided.46
In addition to attendance requirements, the divisions also differ as to how
each determines its annual national champion. Though the NCAA oversees
and administers a playoff format for determining the annual football champions
of Divisions I-AA, II, and III,47 Division I-A historically decides its champion
quite differently. Prior to 1998, two polls determined the national champion for
college football's highest division: One poll tallied the votes of selected
sportswriters and broadcasters (the Associated Press, or AP, poll), and the other
poll counted votes cast by certain Division I-A head coaches (the coaches'
ocsn.com/properties/acc-properties.html (last visited June 19,2004) (discussing the conference-
sponsored agency that oversees marketing and promotional operations for member schools) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Big East Conference, The BigEast Conference
at 25 Years, at http://www.bigeast.org/about/ (last visited June 19, 2004) (explaining the
conference's infrastructure and the role it plays in coordinating competitions and publicizing the
athletic programs of member schools) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Mountain West Conference, The Birth of a Conference, at http://themwc.ocsn.com/about/mwc-
about.html (last visited June 19, 2004) ("The cornerstone of the conference's formation was the
maintenance of long standing athletic rivalries among its member institutions.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Southeastern Conference, History of the SEC, at
http://www.secsports.com/index.phpwell_id=2& urljpublish channel_id=19 (last visited June
19, 2004) (describing the preexisting regional connections among southern schools that led to
the conference's formation and facilitated scheduling of athletic competitions) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Being a member of a conference can also impact university
programs beyond the athletic arena. See, e.g., Western Athletic Conference Academic Alliance,
About the WAC Academic Alliance, at http://www.wacacademics.orglabout/ (last visited June
19, 2004) (noting that an academic association among Western Athletic Conference schools will
allow each member's respective advantages and strengths to be shared with others within the
conference) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See, e.g., Southeastern Conference, SEC Milestones, at http://www.secsports.com/
index.php?well_id=2&url_publish channelid=l 9 (last visited June 19, 2004) (noting that the
SEC was the first conference to have a postseason football game to determine its champion) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Conferences are not, however, given absolute
discretion about holding a postseason championship game. The NCAA requires that a league
have twelve members in order to administer such a game, and efforts by the Atlantic Coast
Conference to alter this rule were suppressed by the national organization in January of 2004.
See Barry Svrluga, No BC for ACC Until Next Year, Title Game Aspirations Put on Hold,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2004, at D2 ("NCAA rules require a conference to have 12 members to
stage such a [conference championship] game, and an ACC-backed effort to change that rule
failed ...").
47. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, NCAA Championships, at http://www.ncaa.org/
indexl.html (last visited June 19, 2004) (noting that the NCAA regulates a football
championship in all divisions except Division I-A) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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poll).48 Each poll proclaimed the team voted number one at the end of the
postseason to be the national champion.49
This method of selecting a champion traditionally emphasized Division I-
A's unique postseason format. Instead of competing for a position in a playoff
bracket, Division I-A conferences and teams lobby for invitations to compete in
"bowl games,"50 postseason football competitions that are held during the
Christmas and New Year's holiday seasons5" and are typically hosted by larger
cities.5 2 Nonprofit entities generally organize the contests and several related
activities designed to heighten interest in the game,5 3 such as the Tournament of
Roses Parade which accompanies the Rose Bowl. 4 Although bowl games
became an annual tradition in 1916," the number of these games has boomed
48. See 2004 ESPN SPORTS ALMANAC 153-54 (Gerry Brown & Michael Morrison eds.,
2003) [hereinafter SPORTS ALMANAC] (discussing the role that these polls played in determining
a national champion between 1936 and 1998).
49. Id. at 153. The final AP poll has been released after the conclusion of the bowl season
annually since 1968. Id. at 156.
50. See POPPE, supra note 13, at 7 (explaining that the purpose ofa postseason bowl game
is to "provid[e] a national contest between deserving winning teams").
5I. See id. at 5-6 (noting that the 2003-04 bowl season stretched from Dec. 16, 2003, to
Jan. 4, 2004).
52. While the focus of bowl games is generally on the participating schools, hosting a
bowl game can be lucrative for a state as well. See, e.g., Long v. Napolitano, 53 P.3d 172, 176
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that hosting the Fiesta Bowl in Tempe, Arizona, generated $133
million for the state's economy in 1999); see also Valerie Bauerlein, $700,000for Football
Ignites Budget Furor, STATE (Columbia, SC), Mar. 4, 2004, at A I (estimating that the creation
of a new bowl game in Charleston, South Carolina, would generate nearly $50 million for the
state's tourism industry); Football Bowl Ass'n, Bowl Games are College Football, at
http://www.footballbowlassociation.com/overview.htn-1 (last visited June 19, 2004) [hereinafter
Football Bowl Ass'n, Bowl Games] ("[In the aggregate,] [b]owl games generate an estimated
$1.1 billion dollars worth of economic impact for their host communities each year.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. See Football Bowl Ass'n, College Football Bowl Game Facts, at
http://www.footballbowlassociation.com/faq.htmi (last visited June 19,2004) ("Almost all Bowl
games are non-profit organizations. The more revenue the Bowl brings in through ticket sales,
sponsors, etc.[,] the more money can be paid to NCAA schools.") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
54. See 2004 Tournament of Roses, Tournament of Roses Special Events, at http://www.
toumamentofroses.com/current/specialevents.htm (last visited June 19, 2004) (describing events
accompanying the annual Rose Parade and Rose Bowl game hosted by Pasadena, California)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Each bowl has its own unique bundle of
events that supplements the game itself. See, e.g., FedEx Orange Bowl, Events, at http://www.
orangebowl.org/events.php (last visited June 19, 2004) (listing events, such as a collegiate
basketball tournament, a collegiate swimming tournament, and a benefit for a scholarship fund,
that are organized in conjunction with the Orange Bowl game, played annually in Miami,
Florida) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 173 (listing the outcomes of every Rose Bowl
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since 1990.56 The 2003-04 postseason consisted of twenty-eight bowl games,
up from only a handful in the 1970s and 1980s.57 The tradition of Division I-A
bowl games is one of the most celebrated aspects of intercollegiate athletics,
and the NCAA and many other institutions vigorously defend it as the most
favorable way to conclude each college football season.58
Many incentives exist to entice schools to participate in bowl games. In
addition to increased exposure for a school and its football program, playing in
a postseason game can generate a monetary windfall for both the competing
schools and their respective conferences.5 The financial rewards that stem
from participating in a bowl game range from $750,000 per school for
participating in newly created games6 to more than $8 million per school for
participating in the more established ones.61 Funding received from bowl
competition, with the first game played in 1902 and the game becoming an annual event
beginning in 1916).
56. See id. at 177-80 (noting that fourteen new bowl games were created between the
1990 and 2003 seasons).
57. For the 2003-04 college football season, fifty-six Division I-A teams participated in
twenty-eight bowl games. Football Bowl Ass'n, Bowl Games, supra note 52.
58. See BCS or Bust: Competitive and Economic Effects of the Bowl Championship
Series On and Off the Field: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Myles Brand, President, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n) [hereinafter
Brand, Senate Statement] ("[The bowl games] brought a level of drama and excitement to
postseason football and the communities where they took place that continues as a fixture of the
American sports culture .... Th[e bowl system] is an exciting feature of Division I-A football
worth preserving .. "), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfn?id=973 (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Why Doesn't the
NCAA Administer a Division I-A Football Championship?, at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/mem
bership/postseasonfootball/faq (last visited June 19, 2004) [hereinafter NCAA, NCAA Does
Not Administer Division I-A Championship] (explaining that the universities within the NCAA
have collectively rejected proposals for establishing a playoff format to select a Division I-A
football champion on three separate occasions since 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
59. See Football Bowl Ass'n, Bowl Games, supra note 52 (noting the benefits derived by
a school by participating in a bowl, including increased enrollment applications, licensing
revenues, and season ticket sales, among others).
60. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Total Non-BCS Distribution to Participating
Teams and Conferences (2003) (listing the payouts offered by each of the bowl games not
affiliated with the BCS following the 2002-03 college football season), available at
http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/post season_football/nonBCSrevenue.pdf(on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The average payout for non-BCS games for the 2002-03
season was $1.4 million. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,Average Payout, Institution Expenses,
and Net Receipts (2003) [hereinafter NCAA, Average Payout], available at http://wwwl.
ncaa.org/membership/postseason-football/averagestats.pdf(on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
61. See NCAA, 2002-03 BCS Revenue Distribution, supra note 14 (listing the payouts
offered by each of the four BCS games). The average payout for BCS games for the 2002-03
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participation, therefore, can be a substantial source of revenue for many
colleges and universities. Schools often use these funds to upgrade their
athletic programs, primarily by financing sports other than football and
improving athletic facilities.62 More important for many schools, though, is the
ability to fund academic programs and facilities through football-created
revenue.
63
By not administering a playoff system, the NCAA allows the outcomes of
these bowl games to determine the Division I-A national champion. As a
result, each bowl tries to persuade the best available teams to compete in its
game; with premier teams come large revenues from ticket sales, television
contracts, and corporate sponsors, among other sources.64 This race to establish
top-notch match-ups resulted in preseason agreements between bowls and
conferences that, ironically, made a game between the two best teams at the
conclusion of each season nearly impossible.65
B. The Relationship Between Conferences and the Bowls
Like conferences, bowl games operate independently of one another. As
such, bowls are free to contract with conferences to schedule which schools
will participate in each postseason game. For example, between 1946 and
1997, the Rose Bowl game paired the respective champions of the Big Ten and
season was $14.3 million. NCAA, Average Payout, supra note 60. Many conferences have
adopted revenue-sharing plans, so it is rare for a school to capture the entire bowl payout solely
for itself. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining the revenue-sharing plans found
within most Division I-A conferences).
62. See, e.g., John Maher, Big Bucks: Football, Finances Separate Entities, But Buckeyes
Play Both Games Well, AusTN AM.-STATESMAN (Austin, Tex.), Sept. 24, 2003, at DI (noting
various uses for financial resources generated by football, particularly for upgrades to existing
facilities); Michael Yount, Football: The 800-Pound Gorilla in College Athletics (pt. 2), SALT
LAKE TmB. (Salt Lake City, Utah), June 15, 2003, at AI (discussing the role football plays in
financing other college sports teams).
63. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 6, at 7G (explaining the relationship between the
University of Georgia's athletics program and academic sector while noting that the athletics
department contributed "$1.5 million to the university for non-athletic scholarships with a
commitment for another $500,000 over the next five years").
64. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2002-03 Postseason Football 5- Year Summary of
Gross Receipts, at http://wwwi.ncaa.org/membership/postseasonfootball/summgross
receipts.pdf (Apr. 21, 2003) (detailing the amount of income generated by each source of
revenue during the bowl season since the BCS plan was implemented) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See infra Part II.C (describing inefficiencies created by the Division I-A postseason
system that predated the BCS).
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Pacific Ten conferences.66 Likewise, the Southeastern Conference's champion
was designated to play in the Sugar Bowl between 1976 and 1994,67 and the
Holiday Bowl hosted the Western Athletic Conference champion in all but one
season between 1978 and 1995. 68 These arrangements are not limited to
conference champions and can determine in which bowl games all of a
conference's eligible schools will compete. 69
Because a parent conference typically is the facilitator for a school's
participation in a bowl, many conferences adopted revenue-sharing plans that
equally divide all bowl-revenues captured by member schools.70 Plans such as
these help prevent a school from being placed at a financial disadvantage
relative to its peers within a conference. Naturally, when a conference
participates in more bowl games, it has more funds to distribute among its
members. As a consequence, a rational conference seeks to maximize its
representation in bowls. The independence each conference enjoys in this
pursuit traditionally resulted in uncoordinated efforts to create postseason
66. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 173 (noting which conferences have been
represented in the Rose Bowl through the game's history).
67. See id. at 174 (detailing the history of the Sugar Bowl's process for selecting
participants). Despite no formal agreement, a team from the Southeastern Conference
participated in all but six Sugar Bowls played between 1935 and 1998, the year that the BCS
became effective. See id. (noting that no SEC team played in the 1939, 1942, 1946, 1949, 1972,
and 1995 Sugar Bowl games).
68. See id. at 176 (noting the relationship between the Holiday Bowl and the Western
Athletic Conference through the game's early history). The 1985 Holiday Bowl did not feature
the Western Athletic Conference champion as one of the participants because the conference's
championship was split between Brigham Young University and the Air Force Academy. Id. at
176, 187.
69. See, e.g., CONFERENCE USA, Going Bowlin", in 2003 CONFERENCE USA FOOTBALL
GUIDE 5 (2003) (listing the five bowl games with which the conference had an agreement to
send a member team following the 2003-04 football season), available at http://www.con
ferenceusa.com/sports/footbaVmediaday/2003/mediaguide/l-8.pdf(on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 175-80 (noting the bowl games in
which teams placing second through seventh in the Southeastern Conference are bound to play
pursuant to a contractual agreement); Big East Conference, The Big East Bowl Lineup, at
http://www.bigeast.org/sports/football/bowls.asp (last visited June 19, 2004) (listing the bowl
games conference members will participate in while noting that "[flinish in the conference
standings does not determine bowl selection") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
70. See, e.g., Brian Davis, BCS Boosts Title Game Support; OU's Sugar Bowl Berth
Allays Big 12 Schools' Fears of a Late Loss, DALLAS MORNING NFws, Dec. 9, 2003, at 8C
("The Big [Twelve] is a revenue-sharing league."); Dooley, supra note 6, at 7G (noting that the
Southeastern Conference is a revenue-sharing association); Tim Layden, Small Change; Going
to a Football Bowl Game-Unless It's One of the Biggies-Makes Little Financial Sensefor
Most Schools, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 2, 1995, at 56 ("[M]ost major conferences share a
large portion of the revenue earned by member schools from bowl games.").
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match-ups among conference champions. 71 The same was true of the bowls;
each focused on its own game without regard for the choices and agreements
made by its peers. This disjointedness often failed to produce the most
desirable match-ups at the conclusion of the regular season.
C. Traditional Division I-A Postseason Inefficiencies
As discussed, Division I-A's method of choosing its annual champion is
unlike any other NCAA-regulated sport.72 Instead of using an objective
measure of a team's relative abilities, the determination of which school fielded
a superior team was historically left to the subjective opinions of sportswriters
and broadcasters in one poll, and college football head coaches in the other.73
The subjectivity of this system was its biggest weakness. 74 The polls failed to
provide a consistently accurate reflection of each school's abilities, and
underlying prejudices of the voters, such as regional biases75 and groundless76
favoritism of certain schools, often skewed the polls' results. As a result, the
two polls frequently conflicted with one another, and nearly one-quarter of the
Division I-A seasons between 1954 and 1997 ended with "split" championships
between two schools.77
71. See supra Part lI.B (explaining how conferences independently seek to contract with
bowl games). The Rose Bowl was the only bowl game that paired two conference champions
for more than five consecutive seasons. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 173-80
(noting that most bowl games either paired a conference champion and an "at-large" opponent
or two schools that had not won a conference championship).
72. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (noting that Divisions I-AA, II, and III
all incorporate playoff formats to determine their respective annual champions while Division I-
A traditionally relied on the subjective viewpoints of voters in two different national polls).
73. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the AP and coaches'
polls in Division I-A football).
74. See Tim Layden, It's Debatable; Is College Football Better Off with Whimsical Polls
and Co-Champs Like Michigan and Nebraska than with the Vagaries of a Playoff System?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 12, 1998, at 34 (noting that polls can be manipulated to a voter's
personal benefit while explaining that "[n]either the coaches nor the media are given voting
guidelines").
75. See, e.g., Bud Withers, Weird Science, in DON HEiNRICH'S COLLEGE FOOTBALL
ANNUAL 1991, at 14, 16 (Shane O'Neill ed., 1991) (explaining that "regionalism is a fact of life
in the polls" while criticizing geographic voting tendencies present in the polling system).
76. See id. at 14 (noting that the University of Illinois finished the 1962 season ranked as
the eighteenth best team in the nation despite losing seven of its nine games).
77. See Josh Dubow, Divided Crown Has Left Few Happy, STATE (Columbia, SC), Dec.
27, 2003, at C6 (describing problems caused by the polling systems formerly used to decide
college football's national champion). Split championships occurred in 1954 (the Ohio State
University and the University of California at Los Angeles shared the championship), 1957 (the
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There is tremendous significance in winning a national championship.
Contention for a national championship can provide much pride for a school; it
can be used as a recruiting tool for both student-athletes and non-athletes; and it
can generate substantial monetary rewards through alumni donations, increases
in ticket sales, and other sources of revenue.78 While allowing the two best
teams to play one another at the conclusion of each season would have avoided
the problem of splitting the national championship, this result occurred only if
the conferences with the top two teams at season's end had contracted with the
same bowl game before the season. 79 A few snapshots from Division I-A's
postseason during the thirty years that preceded the BCS-that is, between the
1968 and 1997 seasons-further illustrate the inefficiencies that plagued the
traditional system, which allowed subjective polls to determine the national
champion and all bowl games to operate independently of one another.
The 1969 college football regular season concluded with two schools, the
Universities of Texas and Pennsylvania State (Penn State), that had neither lost
nor tied a game and were ranked numbers one and two in the polls. 80 Instead of
playing one another to determine a national champion, each of these teams
played, and beat, a school that had already been defeated once during the
season.8' This outcome was the direct result of a preseason agreement between
Texas's conference and the Cotton Bowl that required Texas, the conference
champion, to participate in the Cotton Bowl instead of permitting Texas to
bargain for the opportunity to play the other unbeaten and untied team in a
different bowl game.8 2 This outcome left voters to decide which team deserved
Universities of Auburn and Ohio State), 1965 (the Universities of Alabama and Michigan
State), 1970 (the Universities of Texas and Nebraska), 1973 (the Universities of Notre Dame
and Alabama), 1974 (the Universities of Oklahoma and Southern California), 1978 (the
Universities of Alabama and Southern California), 1990 (the University of Colorado and the
Georgia Institute of Technology), 1991 (the Universities of Miami of Florida and Washington),
and 1997 (the Universities of Michigan and Nebraska) under the former polls system. Id.
78. See, e.g., Brian Goff, An Assessment of Path Dependence in Collective Decisions.
Evidence From Football Polls, 28 APPLIED ECON. 291,291-97 (1996) (analyzing the economic
benefits that accompany winning a Division I-A national championship); see also Alan
Schmadtke & David Damron, UCF Takes Risk With Big-Time Athletics; Critics Said a Higher
Profile in Sports Won't Help the School's Academic Reputation, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
Nov. 9, 2003, at A I (explaining that Virginia Tech saw its endowment nearly triple in the years
surrounding its national runner-up finish in 1999).
79. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text (discussing the preseason practice of
conferences and bowls to determine which schools would participate in the postseason games).
80. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 163 (noting that the Universities of Texas
and Penn State completed the 1969 regular season undefeated and untied).
81. See id. (noting that Texas defeated the University of Notre Dame in the Cotton Bowl
while Penn State beat the University of Missouri in the Orange Bowl).
82. See id. at 175 (explaining that the champion of the Southwestern Conference, of
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the championship without the benefit of a head-to-head match-up. Similar
circumstances existed following the 1970, 1979, 1983, 1991, 1994, 1996, and
1997 regular seasons.8 3 More telling is that, because of predetermined bowl
arrangements, only nine of thirty seasons between 1968 and 1997 ended with
the polls' number one and number two teams meeting in the postseason.1
4
Even pairing the polls' top two teams in a postseason bowl failed to ensure
that a national champion would emerge from the game. Consider the 1973
national championship, for instance, which the University of Notre Dame split
with the University of Alabama.85 These schools played one another in the
Sugar Bowl following the regular season, and Notre Dame won the game by a
single point.8 6 The coaches' poll, however, still awarded Alabama its version
of the national championship exclusively because of Alabama's regular season
performance.87
The subjectivity of the polls caused them to be unpredictable, inconsistent,
and, in many cases, arbitrary in their selection of a national champion.
Compare the poll outcomes of the 1970, 1975, and 1984 seasons. As noted, the
1970 national championship was split between the Universities of Nebraska
and Texas.8" Neither of these schools completed their seasons unbeaten and
untied. 9 Both Arizona State University and the University of Toledo, on the
other hand, ended their respective seasons without any losses or ties.90 The AP
poll, though, did not consider either of these schools to be among the country's
five best at the conclusion of the postseason, ranking Arizona State sixth and
which Texas was a member in 1969, was obligated to play in the Cotton Bowl each season
between 1941 and 1991).
83. See id. at 164, 166-67, 169-71 (listing seasons during which the AP poll's top two
undefeated teams at the conclusion of the regular season were unable to play one another in a
bowl game for the national championship due to previously arranged bowl obligations for one
or both of the undefeated schools).
84. See id. at 155 (listing occasions where the number one and number two teams,
according to the AP poll, played one another in a bowl game).
85. See Dubow, supra note 77, at C6 (noting that the Universities of Alabama and Notre
Dame split the 1973 championship).
86. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 174 (stating that Notre Dame defeated
Alabama in the 1973 Sugar Bowl by a score of 24-23).
87. See id. at 154 (noting that Notre Dame won the AP poll's national championship
while the coaches' poll awarded its national championship to Alabama).
88. See Dubow, supra note 77, at C6 (listing Nebraska and Texas as the co-national
champions for the 1970 season).
89. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 164 (noting that Nebraska tied one game
during the 1970 season while Texas lost in the Cotton Bowl).
90. See id. (noting that Arizona State won all eleven of its football games and that Toledo
won all twelve of its games in 1970).
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Toledo twelfth.9' Arizona State suffered the same fate following the 1975
season, when it was the only school to finish its season without any losses or
ties.92 Despite beating a team considered the nation's sixth best at the end of
the regular season,93 the polls again denied Arizona State a national
championship and instead voted that the University of Oklahoma-which lost
during the regular season-was the country's best football team.
94
In 1984, though, the polls took a different attitude when crowning a
national champion. That season, only Brigham Young University finished
without any losses or ties.9 The quality of its competition was unusually low,
however, as the polls did not consider a single of Brigham Young's opponents
to be among the country's twenty best teams.96 Additionally, the school won its
bowl game by only seven points against a University of Michigan team that had
lost half of its games and finished in the bottom tier of its conference. 97 Instead
of voting for a team that had proven itself against challenging competition, the
polls named Brigham Young University the national champion simply because
it was the only team to complete its season unbeaten and untied.9 Such a stark
change in voting patterns cautions against relying solely on the polls to provide
an accurate assessment of each football team's relative skills and abilities.
This sampling of inconsistent and irreconcilable outcomes highlights the
inefficient procedures used to create the Division I-A postseason prior to the
BCS. These problems could have been alleviated if conferences and bowls had
91. Id.
92. See id. at 165 (noting that Arizona State completed the 1975 season with twelve wins
against zero losses or ties).
93. See id. (explaining that Arizona State defeated the University of Nebraska, ranked the
nation's sixth best team in the AP poll at the time, in the Fiesta Bowl).
94. See id. at 154 (stating that Oklahoma was Division -A's national champion for the
1975 season).
95. See id. at 167 (noting that Brigham Young won all thirteen of its games played in
1984).
96. See Information Please, 1984 College Football Recap, at http://www.infoplease.com/
ipsa/A0747028.html (last visited June 19, 2004) [hereinafter 1984 Recap] (describing Brigham
Young University's 1984 schedule as "real weak" while noting that none of its opponents
finished ranked among the nation's top twenty teams in the final AP poll) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Withers, supra note 75, at 14 (criticizing the quality
of Brigham Young University's competition during the 1984 season).
97. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 167 (noting that Brigham Young won the
1984 Holiday Bowl by a score of twenty-four to seventeen); 1984 Recap, supra note 96
(explaining that Michigan placed sixth in its conference in 1984 and finished that season with
six wins and six losses).
98. See 1984 Recap, supra note 96 ("[The [Brigham Young University] Cougars were
the only major college team to win all their games, so they were [voted] national champions by
default.").
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deferred the creation of postseason match-ups until the completion of the
regular season, but the rigidity of the traditional bowl system did not permit
such a waiting period. 99 Moreover, an objective mechanism for selecting
Division I-A's annual champion could have avoided splitting the national
championship and its spoils between two schools. Instead, when the tradition
of predetermining bowl participants was teamed with the arbitrary nature of the
polls, college football's postseason was left disorganized and inconclusive.'co
In 1998, several conferences and bowls collaborated on a postseason format
designed to cure these problems and to produce a postseason of an overall
higher quality.'10
D. Enriching the Postseason: The Bowl Championship Series
1. The Purposes, Procedures, and Results of the Bowl Championship Series
Six conferences-the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big Ten, Big Twelve,
Pacific Ten, and Southeastern Conferences-and four bowl games-the Fiesta,
Orange, Rose, and Sugar Bowls-sought to remedy the inefficiencies generated
by the traditional Division I-A postseason format by creating the Bowl
Championship Series. 0 2 Many of the involved conferences traditionally sent
99. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text (describing how bowls and conferences
generally agreed on bowl game participants before each season).
100. See supra notes 77, 80-98 and accompanying text (explaining the problems caused by
Division -A's former postseason structure).
101. See infra Part II.D (describing the methodology of the BCS in creating postseason
contests between high quality teams).
102. See BCS, BCS Members, supra note 13 (listing the conferences and bowls that were
parties to the initial BCS agreement). In addition to these six conferences, Conference USA was
an initial signatory to the BCS agreement despite not having automatic representation in any
BCS bowl game. Id. Likewise, the University of Notre Dame, a school unaffiliated with any
conference, and the American Broadcast Company are also parties to the BCS arrangement. Id.
Prior to the BCS, a handful of conferences and bowls attempted to create a product similar
to that formed by this agreement. See The BowlAlliance, in 1996 INFORMATION PLEASE SPORTS
ALMANAC 186 (Mike Meserole ed. 1995) (detailing the 1992 agreement between five
conferences and three bowl games designed to produce a national championship game). These
arrangements, known as the Bowl Alliance and the Bowl Coalition, failed to remedy the
problems of the traditional system and were dissolved in favor of the BCS after the 1997 season.
See K. Todd Wallace, Elite Domination of College Football: An Analysis of the Antitrust
Implications of the BowlAlliance, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 57,63 (1999) (noting the termination of the
Bowl Alliance in favor of the BCS). For an analysis of the Bowl Alliance, see generally
Lafcadio Darling, Note, The College BowlAlliance and the Sherman Act, 21 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 433 (1998-99).
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their champions to one of these bowl games. 0 3 Instead of prematurely locking
participants into less desirable match-ups, the BCS now creates a pool of six
conference champions and two other high-quality teams from which the four
bowls select their respective competitors. 1°4 To determine which non-
conference champions will participate in a BCS bowl game, the BCS applies a
numerical formula to provide an objective gauge of each Division I-A school's
relative abilities. 105 Each team's "worth" is determined by tabulating the values
of five components, the majority of which purge the calculation of any
subjective biases to which the old system was vulnerable.'06 Schools are then
ranked based on their respective scores; the formula considers those with lower
scores superior to those with higher ones.
0 7
The first factor in the evaluation accounts for each school's ranking in the
two polls that formerly served as the exclusive determinant of a team's relative
abilities. 08 A school's average ranking in these polls forms the value of this
variable. 1 9 The second factor is also dependent on a school's ranking, but
seven computers generate these polls, which are published by major media
outlets. 10 As with the first variable, this value is determined by calculating
each school's average ranking in these polls."'
103. As discussed, the Rose Bowl historically contracted with the champions of the Big
Ten and Pacific Ten conferences while the Sugar Bowl hosted the Southeastern Conference's
champion. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (describing the relationships among
the Rose and Sugar Bowls and their respective participants). The Atlantic Coast Conference
sent its champion to the Orange Bowl for some time while the Big Twelve champion
participated in the Fiesta Bowl prior to the BCS. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 173-
74 (noting which conferences were given automatic slots to participate in the Orange and Fiesta
Bowls).
104. See POPPE, supra note 13, at 8-9 (explaining how each BCS bowl game chooses its
participants).
105. See id. at 9-11 (explaining the statistical rating system used to determine which teams
will participate in the BCS).
106. See id. at 9 (noting that only one of the five factors in the formula involves the
inherently subjective AP and coaches' polls).
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Id.
110. See id. (listing the seven computer polls that are accounted for in the BCS formula,
including the Jeff Sagarin-USA Today, Dr. Peter Wolfe, Richard Billingsley, Colley Matrix,
Kenneth Massey, Anderson and Hester, and The New York Times polls). Beginning with the
2004-05 football season, The New York Times poll will no longer be part of this component.
See Bowl Championship Series, Bowl Championship Series Announces Changes to Standings
Formula, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/news.cfn?headline=40 (July 15, 2004) [hereinafter
BCS, Changes to Formula] (noting that The New York Times has withdrawn its poll from the
BCS ranking system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
1i. See POPPE, supra note 13, at 10. ("The computer component will be determined by
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The remaining variables in the formula attempt to quantify the on-field
performance of each school during the course of the season. The first variable
assigns a value to the strength of the schedule played by each team." 2 This
value is derived from the winning percentages of both the instant team's
opponents and its opponents' opponents.' 13 The next component focuses on
the instant team's record, adding one point to a team's total score for each loss
prior to the bowl season.' 14 The final variable rewards "quality wins""' by
deducting points for each victory over a team ranked among the nation's ten
best in the BCS standings."16
Once each variable has a value, an overall total is determined by adding
these values together. 1 7 The two schools with the lowest cumulative scores-
regardless of their conferences' affiliation with the BCS-are then paired to
averaging the seven computer rankings. The lowest (worst) computer ranking will be
disregarded.").
112. Id.
113. See id. (explaining how the strength of schedule component is calculated). The BCS
formula first determines the cumulative won-loss records of the instant team's opponents and
the cumulative won-loss records of that teams' opponents' opponents. Id. These values are
then weighted two-thirds for the opponents' record and one-third for the opponents' opponents'
record. Id. "The team's schedule shall be calculated to determine in which quartile it will rank:
1-25; 26-50; 51-75; 76-100, and shall be further quantified by its ranking within each quartile
(divided by 25)." Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. (defining a quality win as one over an "opponent ranked among the top ten in
the BCS standings").
116. See id. at 10-1l (explaining how the quality win component impacts each team's final
position in the BCS standing). A school that defeats the top-ranked team in the BCS standings
is rewarded with a deduction of 1.0 points from its BCS calculated value. Id. at I1. Likewise, a
team that defeats the second-best school deducts 0.9 points from its value. Id. This process
continues on a descending basis to victories over the remaining teams ranked among the top ten
in the BCS standings with a victory over the number ten team resulting in a subtraction of 0. 1
points. Id.
In July of 2004, the Bowl Championship Series reduced the number of variables in its
formula to three: the AP poll, the coaches' poll, and the computer polls. See BCS, Changes to
Formula, supra note 110 (explaining alterations to the BCS formula). Each component is given
equal weight in this updated formula. Id. This Note, however, considers how each of the
formula's five historical components impacts the antitrust analysis because of the significant
role that a restraint's history plays in the analysis. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
(1997) (explaining that a rule of reason analysis requires an investigation of "a restraint's
history, nature, and effect," among several other factors, when considering whether it is a
reasonable restraint on competition). Because the BCS formula has traditionally consisted of
variables that account for a team's strength of schedule and quality wins, it may be misleading
to disregard these components because of the weight a court would likely give them.
117. PoPPE, supra note 13, at I!.
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play, thereby creating a previously unavailable national championship game.1
8
This championship game rotates through the four bowls, and the three BCS
games that are not hosting the national championship game fill their respective
positions from a menu of remaining BCS-conference champions and certain at-
large teams." 9 In order to ensure that only high-caliber teams are chosen to
play in a BCS game, the arrangement establishes certain criteria for selecting
at-large teams.' 20  Teams from non-BCS conferences, for instance,
automatically qualify for a BCS bowl game if they finish ranked in the top six
in the BCS standings.' 2' The BCS bowls can also select any team that won
nine games and is ranked among the top twelve in the final BCS standings for
remaining at-large slots. 122
Since its inception, the BCS has generated enormous revenues-about
$100 million annually-and distributed them to all Division I-A conferences.
23
The portion of this revenue that each conference receives is based on whether it
is represented in a BCS bowl game. 24 Those that send a participant to a BCS
game receive a substantially larger sum than those that are not represented. 25
Indeed, the BCS has distributed nearly ninety-five percent of the revenue it has
created among the six BCS-member conferences. 26 This disparity can be
traced directly to the fact that no non-BCS conference has been represented in a
BCS bowl game since the arrangement's implementation. 27 It is this fact,
coupled with the large difference in distribution of BCS-generated funds
118. Id. at9.
119. See id. at 8-9 (outlining which schools are eligible to participate in a BCS game).
120. See id. (explaining the methods used to determine which schools would play in the
three nonchampionship BCS bowls).
121. See id. at 9 (noting how an at-large team could automatically qualify to play in a BCS
bowl game).
122. Id. at8.
123. See Bowl Championship Series, Revenue Distribution, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/
revenue.shtml (last visited June 19, 2004) [hereinafter BCS, Revenue Distribution] (projecting
the amount of funding created by the BCS in the 2004 postseason that each Division I-A
conference will receive) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); NCAA, 2002-03
BCS Revenue Distribution, supra note 14 (noting that each Division I-A conference received
funds generated by the BCS following the 2002-03 bowl season).
124. See BCS, Revenue Distribution, supra note 123 (explaining how BCS revenue is
divided among Division I-A conferences).
125. See id. (noting that those conferences that send teams to a BCS bowl game are
compensated for their representation to a greater extent than those that do not).
126. See NCAA, 2002-03 BCS Revenue Distribution, supra note 14 (listing how much
BCS-created funding each conference received following the 2002-03 postseason).
127. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (discussing that no BCS game has hosted
a school from a non-BCS conference).
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between BCS conferences and non-BCS conferences, that has sparked concern
among some university presidents and national lawmakers.
2. Recent Challenges to the Bowl Championship Series
In the fall of 2003, the Presidential Coalition began to question the BCS and its
impact on both college football and the overall university community. 128 The group
presented its concerns to Congress and now challenges the arrangement on several
fronts. 29 The Presidential Coalition takes primary issue with the fact that six of the
eight available BCS bowl game positions are guaranteed to schools within the BCS
conferences. 3 This "limited access" creates a system that, according to the
Presidential Coalition, "is unnecessarily causing a widening financial gap between
BCS and non-BCS schools that [has] a cumulative negative effect on all college
sports, not just football."'' Moreover, it claims that the BCS adversely affects non-
BCS institutions with regard to student recruitment, retention of coaches, facility
improvements, and public perception, among other harms. 32 Instead of the former
postseason format or the BCS scheme, the Presidential Coalition advocates a playoff
system to decide Division I-A's national championship. 33 The desirability of a
playoff in Division I-A college football is not universally agreed upon, though, and
many involved in the industry seek to maintain the current postseason structure.
134
Presidents of BCS-affiliated schools have met with Presidential Coalition
representatives on three separate occasions to discuss potential changes that could
make the postseason more inclusive of schools not privy to the BCS agreement.1
35
128. See supra Part I (discussing the Presidential Coalition's grievances with the BCS).
129. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional
intervention against the BCS sought by the Presidential Coalition).
130. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (criticizing the BCS as a "system of
limited access").
131. Id.
132. See id. (outlining reasons for the Presidential Coalition's opposition to the BCS).
133. See id. (arguing that an eight-team playoff system would "open access to all
contenders").
134. See Brand, Senate Statement, supra note 58 (explaining opposition to a playoff format
in Division I-A football); see also NCAA, NCAA Does Not Administer Division I-A
Championship, supra note 58 (noting that the NCAA's membership rejected proposals that
would have established a Division I-A playoff in 1976, 1988, and 1994).
135. See Bowl Championship Series, BCS/Coalition Press Conference-Opening
Statement, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/news040229.shtml (Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter BCS,
Opening Statement] (noting meetings between the BCS and the Presidential Coalition) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The two groups first met on September 8, 2003,
and again on November 16, 2003. See Bowl Championship Series, BCS/Coalitionfor Athletics
Reform Press Conference-Opening Statement, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/news031116.
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The Presidential Coalition consistently used threats of an antitrust suit as leverage in
these negotiations.136 On February 29, 2004, the two groups conditionally agreed
that a fifth bowl game might be added to the BCS postseason structure. 37 This
potential alteration, however, does not cure the underlying problems perceived by
the Presidential Coalition. Instead, it simply provides for the inclusion of four,
rather than two, at-large teams to play in a BCS game; there is no guarantee that
either of these additional slots will be granted to a non-BCS team. 3' Despite the
supposed compromise, the specter of an antitrust challenge still looms. In addition
to the Presidential Coalition's threatened challenge and congressional distaste for
the BCS, 139 Utah's attorney general has implored the antitrust committee of the
National Association of Attorneys General to investigate the BCS.140 The Note now
addresses such a challenge's likelihood of success.
III. The Sherman Act and Locating Unreasonable Restraints of Trade
The Sherman Antitrust Act is the primary legislation used to combat
agreements between economic actors that restrict the probable outcome of a
competitive and free market.14' In order to establish an antitrust violation under
Section 1 of the Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an agreement exists, that this
agreement unreasonably restrains trade, and that it affects interstate commerce. 42
shtml (Nov. 16, 2003) (evaluating the November 16th meeting between representatives of the
BCS and Presidential Coalition) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Bowl
Championship Series, BCS/Coalition Joint Statement, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news030908.shtml (Sept. 8, 2003) (describing the results of the first meeting between the two
groups) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. See Liz Clarke, Future of BCS Still Faces Major, Mid-Major Issues, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2004, at D4 (explaining the on-going threat of an antitrust challenge to the BCS).
137. See BCS, Opening Statement, supra note 135 (noting that another bowl game maybe
added to the BCS "if the market supports it").
138. See Tony Bamhart, BCS to Add a Fiflh Bowl in 2006, ATLANTA J.-CoNST., Mar. 1,
2004, at I C ("With the addition of an extra game, there will be four at-large spots, thereby
[potentially] improving the access for those non-BCS schools that qualify.").
139. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the reactions of congressional
leaders to the BCS).
140. See Liz Clarke, College Presidents Devise BCS Plan, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17,2003, at
D4 (discussing the action taken by the Utah attorney general with regards to the BCS).
141. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in
pertinent part, that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" is illegal. Id. § I.
142. See Hairston v. Pac. Ten Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)(outlining
the elements of a Sherman Act claim and the respective burdens of proof and production placed
on the parties).
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When, as in the case of the BCS, the first and third elements are not at issue, the
thrust of a Sherman Act analysis focuses on the restraint's effect on competition.
141
A. Methods of Antitrust Analysis
1. The Traditional Tools: Per Se Violations, the Rule of Reason,
and the Quick Look
Although the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged
that only unreasonable restraints of trade violate Section 1,1" an analytical
framework to make such a determination has proven difficult to devise. Over
time, the Court has developed three approaches to ascertaining whether conduct
is unreasonable: "per se" violations, the "rule of reason," and the "quick look"
test. 145 A per se violation occurs when an arrangement "facially appears to be
one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output.' 46 Put differently, an agreement is per se unlawful when it is
"entirely void of redeeming competitive rationales.' 47  Certain types of
behavior, such as group boycotts, 148 have at times been recognized as per se
143. See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (requiring the
plaintiff to prove harm "to competition itself' rather than to just a single firm); Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (explaining that
the Sherman Act requires a court to determine the reasonableness of a restraint's impact on
competition).
144. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98 (noting that, because "every contract is a
restraint of trade," the legislation's recognized purpose is to "prohibit only unreasonable
restraints of trade").
145. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016-17, 1020(10th Cir.
1998) (explaining the three methods of Section I analysis).
146. Id. at 1017 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. I,
19-20 (1979)).
147. Id. at 1016 (quoting SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958,963 (10th Cir.
1994)).
148. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)
(explaining the traditional rule that group boycotts are forbidden behavior under a per se
analysis); Fashion Originator's Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(1941 ) (explaining that, in an instance of a group boycott, the court need not inquire into the
reasonableness of the restraint because this behavior is per se condemned). In Klor's, the Court
defined these boycotts as "concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders." 359 U.S. at
212. But cf NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (refusing to extend the
general rule regarding boycotts to instances where a single buyer decides to buy from one seller
instead of another without providing a legitimate business justification for the choice);
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing, 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985)
("[N]ot every cooperative activity involving a restraint or exclusion [has] the likelihood of
predominantly anticompetitive consequences.").
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violations because they frequently "prove so harmful to competition and so
rarely prove justifliable]."'' 49 If a group boycott is per se unlawful, courts will
not expend judicial resources in examining the alleged procompetitive effects
of and justifications for the arrangement prior to condemning it.'10
In cases challenging conduct that does not fall within a per se rule, courts
will apply one of two analyses that requires an investigation into the overall
impact of an agreement on competition. 15 The more thorough of these is the
rule of reason, which involves several analytical steps. Initially, a plaintiff must
show that an agreement has a significant adverse effect on competition in a
relevant market.5 2 If this burden is met, the defendant must then demonstrate
that the challenged conduct has procompetitive benefits in the same market.1
5 3
Courts have found increasing output, making a new product available,
enhancing quality, and widening consumer choice, among other reasons, to be
acceptable procompetitive justifications for seemingly anticompetitive
behavior.15 4 If the defendant satisfies its burden, the plaintiff must respond by
showing that the agreement is not "reasonably necessary" to attain the offered
procompetitive objectives or "that those objectives can be achieved in a
149. NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 133. The NYNEXopinion recognized a handful of other types of
per se illegal behavior, including horizontal price-fixing (citing United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)), vertical price-fixing (citing Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)), and horizontal market division (citing
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (per curiam)). Id. at 133-34.
150. The Court has not strictly adhered to these categories, however, and has often carved
out exceptions to these general groupings. See, e.g., NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 135 (1998) (choosing
not to apply a per se analysis to an instance of a group boycott); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (explaining that "this case
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is
to be available at all" while exempting the instant case from a per se analysis); Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,23 (1979) (acknowledging that some products
require horizontal price-fixing in order to exist and, therefore, exempting facially
anticompetitive behavior from per se condemnation when these products are at issue).
151. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104 (1984) (noting that the primary inquiry under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act concerns the restraint's impact on competition itself); Banks v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 85 8 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (requiring a plaintiffto
show that "the restraint has an adverse impact on the competition in the relevant market" once
the inquiry has advanced beyond a per se analysis), aff'd, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
152. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998)
("Under this approach, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an agreement had a
substantially adverse effect on competition.").
153. See id. ("[T]he burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of the
procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct.").
154. See id. at 1023 (enumerating acceptable objectives for apparently anticompetitive
conduct while declining to add profitability or cost savings to this list).
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substantially less restrictive manner."'5 If both parties meet their respective
burdens, the factfinder weighs the pro- and anticompetitive effects in the
relevant market against each other in order to determine if the agreement is
reasonable.'
5 6
The alternate approach to evaluating non-per se antitrust complaints is a
condensed version of the rule of reason methodology, called the quick look
analysis. The quick look approach, which is applied infrequently, is used when
conduct appears to have clear adverse effects in a relevant market, but with
some possibility of redeeming procompetitive benefits."5 7 The analysis operates
similarly to the rule of reason approach, but the burden of the first step-the
plaintiff's proof of anticompetitive effects caused by the defendant's conduct-
is lessened because of the obviously harmful nature of the conduct. 5 8 Instead,
the analysis essentially focuses on the procompetitive justifications for the
agreement and, if any are offered, whether the same goals can be achieved
through less restrictive means.' 59 Like the rule of reason analysis, the quick
look evaluation finds an unreasonable restraint when the anticompetitive effects
outweigh their justifications or when the competitive objectives could be
realized in a less limiting manner.' 6
155. Id. at 1019.
156. Id.
157. The Court discussed this concept in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). It noted that "[t]he fact that a
practice is not categorically unlawful in all or most of its manifestations certainly does not mean
that it is universally lawful.... [T~he rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling
of an eye." Id. at 109 n.39 (quoting Pi-naIP ARBEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 37-38 (1981)); see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n,
526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999) (explaining that the quick look analysis is appropriate only where an
"obvious anticompetitive effect" is present); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 (applying a
modified rule of reason analysis because of the presence of a "naked restriction" on both price
and output that resulted from the challenged conduct); Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (evaluating conduct with plainly adverse effects on
competition under the quick look approach).
158. See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (noting that "the court is justified in proceeding
directly to the question of whether the procompetitive justifications advanced for the restraint
outweigh the anticompetitive effects" when the conduct at issue has "obvious anticompetitive
effects").
159. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 110 (requiring a "competitive justification" for
the challenged activity without conducting a detailed analysis of its anticompetitive effects);
Law, 134 F.3d at 1021-24 (rejecting each of the procompetitive rationales offered by the
defendant and, therefore, refusing to address the question of achieving similar benefits through
less anticompetitive means).
160. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1021 (noting that a restraint may not violate the Sherman Act
under a quick look analysis if the competitive benefits balance the anticompetitive harms).
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2. A Recent Trend: California Dental's Practical Approach
Despite the manageable differences among the three analytical categories,
the United States Supreme Court recently diluted these traditional distinctions.
In California Dental Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission,16 1 the Court
explained that the "categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed
than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them
appear." 62 Moreover, the opinion acknowledged the absence of a bright line
between conduct that merits a rule of reason approach and that which calls for a
truncated analysis. 63 In part, this blurriness is traceable to the Court's previous
recognition that, regardless of "[w]hether the ultimate finding [of
reasonableness] is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the
essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint
enhances competition.' 64  Adopting a pragmatic approach, the Court
prescribed "an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details,
and logic of a restraint" when evaluating its impact on competition. 6  The
quick look methodology is appropriate only when the experiences of the market
have unveiled the challenged conduct's restrictive tendencies so clearly that a
court can draw a "confident conclusion" about it. 166  California Dental's
161. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). In California Dental,
the Court considered whether a quick look analysis was sufficient to hold a nonprofit
professional association in violation of antitrust legislation for imposing restrictions on its
members' discount advertising. Id. at 759. The Court's first inquiry involved the Federal Trade
Commission's jurisdiction to hear the case, which it found pursuant to the agency's enabling
statute. Id. at 765-69. It then turned to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's application of the
quick look analysis when it reviewed the Commission's findings. Id. at 769. The Court
reversed this decision, opting instead for a rule of reason analysis. Id. at 769, 778. In
abandoning the lower court's rationale, it noted that the challenged action did not present
obvious anticompetitive effects. Id. at 771. Quick look analysis, according to the Court, should
only be used when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers
and markets." Id. at 770. As the instant conduct could have produced competitive benefits,
such as protecting patients from misleading advertising, the case was remanded to the circuit
court for a full rule of reason analysis. Id. at 781.
162. ld. at 779.
163. See id. at 780-81 (recognizing a difficulty in distinguishing between situations that
have an obvious anticompetitive effect and those that demand more thorough treatment). For a
detailed history of the deterioration of the traditional per se and rule of reason classifications,
see In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 2003 FTC LEXIS 120, at *32-60 (Fed. Trade Comm'n July
24, 2003).
164. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 779-80 (quoting Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Okia., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)).
165. Id. at 78 1.
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remand for a thorough investigation of the restriction's competitive effects may
be best understood as an instruction for courts to perform a detailed market
analysis whenever the totality of the circumstances surrounding a challenged
agreement indicates that it may have competitive benefits. 67 To be sure, the
Court has consistently emphasized the need for a scrupulous evaluation when
the potential for procompetitive benefits is present. 61 With these guidelines in
mind, the analysis turns to dissecting the BCS agreement for a breach of the
Sherman Act.
B. Choosing a Framework for Analysis
As noted, certain types of agreements, such as some group boycotts, are
categorically condemned as per se unreasonable restraints of trade in violation
of Section 1'69 Consequently, an analysis of the BCS necessarily begins by
determining exactly what type of economic behavior the agreement involves in
order to ensure that the appropriate antitrust evaluation is applied. Some
commentators have argued that the BCS warrants per se treatment,1 70 but the
difficulty of placing the arrangement into any of the traditional per se categories
suggests that a more thorough examination is needed.
166. See id. ("The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear,
or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction
will follow from a quick... look, in place of a more sedulous one.").
167. Lower courts have recognized this directive and have started conducting more detailed
evaluations of practices that may have potential competitive benefits. See, e.g., Cont'i Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the California
Dental decision demands an in-depth analysis of the challenged conduct, and that "although the
district court demonstrated mastery of many intricacies of antitrust law, it performed too quick
an analysis"); Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
(applying a rule of reason analysis pursuant to the Court's instructions in California Dental);
Viazis v. Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists, 182 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567-68 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (noting
that the California Dental decision demands more than a quick look when evaluating conduct
that is "not obviously anticompetitive" and when examining regulations of a professional trade
association), aff'd, 314 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2002).
168. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.
Ct. 872, 881 (2004) ("Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and
circumstances of the industry at issue.").
169. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (noting per se violations of the
Sherman Act).
170. See, e.g., Mark Hales, The Antitrust Issues ofNCAA College Football Within the Bowl
Championship Series, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 97, 115 (2003) (characterizing the BCS as a boycott
against nonmember schools to prevent them from participating in the four BCS bowl games
while insisting that the agreement warrants per se treatment). But cf Darling, supra note 102, at
459 (selecting the rule of reason as the best analytical tool for evaluating a similar agreement
between three bowl games and five conferences).
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1. Identifying the Challenged Conduct Within the Bowl
Championship Series
As described in Parts II.B and 11.D, the BCS agreement is the product of
the collective efforts of two groups: six conferences, on the one hand, and four
bowl games on the other.' 7' Each group plays a distinct role in the creation of
college football's annual postseason. The six conferences generate their
respective champions at the conclusion of each season and send them as
representatives to compete in the postseason games., 72  The six member
conferences, therefore, can be characterized as producers of goods-that is,
annual conference champions-that consumers find desirable. The BCS unites
the efforts of these competitors in marketing their respective champions at the
conclusion of each season. Similarly, bowl games compete for the opportunity
to retail these goods to consumers,173 and the agreement arguably combines
their efforts to produce bowl games of an overall higher quality. Because
portions of the BCS involve parties that are at the same level of the competitive
process, some aspects of the agreement are horizontal in nature.
74
Sections of the BCS also represent an agreement between the sets of
conferences and bowl games, 75 groups which occupy different levels in the
production of Division I-A's postseason. Under the BCS, the six conferences
agree not to market their respective champions to games beyond the Fiesta,
Orange, Rose, and Sugar Bowls, while these bowls must select their respective
participants from the menu of eligible teams at the conclusion of each season. 1
76
171. See supra Parts II.B, II.D (describing the relationships among the parties to the BCS
agreement). While the BCS also includes a television broadcaster, this portion of the agreement
is of little importance to the analysis. This is because only one firm at that level of production,
the American Broadcasting Company, is involved. As such, this portion of the arrangement is
vertically related to the BCS, and arrangements of this type do not warrant per se termination.
See, e.g., United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594 (lst Cir. 1993)
("[A] purely vertical arrangement, by which.., a supplier or dealer makes an agreement
exclusively to supply or serve a manufacturer, is not a group boycott.").
172. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that each conference enjoys a
significant measure of independence in determining its annual champion and in which bowl
games its members shall compete).
173. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (describing the competitive nature of
the bowl game market).
174. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 99 (1984) (defining a horizontal restraint as "an agreement among competitors on the way in
which they will compete with one another"); Double D Spotting Serv. v. Supervalu, Inc., 136
F.3d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that "[h]orizontal restraints of trade result when
combinations [occur between] traders at one level of the market structure").
175. See supra Part II.C (explaining the membership composition of the BCS).
176. See POPPE, supra note 13, at 8 (discussing the interlocking agreements among the
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Because of the cooperation required by the conferences at one level of
production with the bowl games at another, the BCS also contains vertical
agreements. 1
77
The importance of identifying some parts of the BCS as horizontal and
others as vertical should not be underestimated. Courts emphasize the
distinction between horizontal and vertical arrangements when choosing which
level of Section 1 scrutiny they will apply. 17  While courts typically afford
challenged vertical agreements the benefit of a rule of reason analysis, there is a
greater likelihood that horizontal conduct limiting competition will be treated as
per se illegal. 179 For this reason, the remaining analysis in Part III.B.2 is
undertaken with an eye toward the horizontal aspects of the BCS-the
agreements among the six conferences and among the four bowl games. °80 Part
IV's evaluation of the agreement's competitive effects assumes that the vertical
aspects of the BCS-the agreement between the group of conferences and the
group of bowl games-should be examined under the rule of reason in
accordance with the majority of cases that have considered such restraints.'
2. Rejecting Per Se Treatment
The argument for automatically voiding the agreement under Section 1
without evaluating its procompetitive benefits brands the BCS as a group
boycott. 8 2 A concerted refusal to deal with competitors, so the argument goes,
conferences and the bowls that produce the ultimate BCS format).
177. See Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290,1295 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting
that vertical restraints involve entities at different levels of production).
178. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982)
("[H]orizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints."); United States
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that vertical
restraints are not condemned as per se violations of Section I of the Sherman Act because the
incentives for such agreements are usually "benign" towards the competitive process, among
other reasons); I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 105 n.607
(5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter ANTrITusT LAW DEVELOPMENTS] (explaining that vertical restraints
are governed by more forgiving standards of review than horizontal ones).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966) (finding that
a horizontal agreement among some competitors to "eliminat[e] ... access to the market" for
others was a per se violation of Section 1); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 218 (1940) (explaining that the Court has "consistently and without deviation" held that
horizontal price-fixing arrangements are per se illegal).
180. See infra Part II1.B.2 (arguing that the rule of reason should apply to the horizontal
aspects of the BCS arrangement).
181. See infra Part IV (analyzing the BCS under the rule of reason framework).
182. See Hales, supra note 170, at 115 ("Within the horizontal agreements of the BCS a
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is traditionally per se illegal, and the BCS should be struck down as a result. 183
Such an analysis, though, clings to dated notions of what constitutes a per se
illegal group boycott and ignores nearly twenty years of developments in the
area.
Prior to 1985, courts terminated agreements among competitors that
excluded others from some aspect of the competitive process without any
inquiry into their reasonableness or procompetitive benefits.8 4 This tradition
changed, though, when the Supreme Court pared the applicability of the per se
rule in the context of group boycotts in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.'85 In Northwest Wholesale, the Court
acknowledged the difficulty of maintaining the precedent of striking concerted
refusals to deal as per se illegal. 8 6  Instead of retaining the sweeping
proscription against horizontal refusals to deal, it articulated a handful of
prerequisite qualifications for triggering per se treatment. 8 7 Chief among these
boycott... has been created."); Cowen, Senate Statement, supra note 18 (describing the BCS as
"restrictive and exclusionary" while arguing that it "severely limits access to post season play").
183. See Hales, supra note 170, at 115 (arguing for per se treatment of the horizontal
aspects of the BCS).
184. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,212 (1959) (using
a per se analysis to dissolve concerted action against a retailer); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945) ("The Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit
independent businesses from becoming 'associates' in a common plan which is bound to reduce
their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which the groups compete."); Fashion
Originator's Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (terminating a
cooperative agreement among clothing designers).
185. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 294-95 (1985) (explaining that not every instance of a group boycott warrants per se
treatment). In Northwest Wholesale, the Court considered whether the expulsion of a member
from a wholesale purchasing cooperative without any explanation or notice violated Section I of
the Sherman Act under per se analysis. Id. at 285-88. The lower court determined the conduct
to be a group boycott and held it per se illegal. Id. at 288-89. The Court disagreed, however,
and provided guidelines for when a group boycott should be given per se treatment. Id. at 289-
95. It turned to prior decisions and discovered that previous per se-condemned boycotts "often
cut off access to a supply, facility, or market necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete."
Id. at 294. Moreover, those participating in the boycott frequently held a dominant position in
the market. Id. The past per se boycotts also lacked procompetitive and efficiency-enhancing
justifications. Id. The Court recognized that wholesale purchasing cooperatives, like the one
presented in the case, often result in more efficient and competitive markets by facilitating the
benefit of scale economies in both purchasing and warehousing of wholesale supplies and by
ensuring quick access to inventories that might not otherwise be available. Id. at 295. As a
consequence, the Court vacated the lower court's per se holding and remanded the case for a
rule of reason analysis. Id. at 298.
186. See id. at 294 ("[T]here is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per se
rule against group boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of the per se doctrine." (quoting
LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 83, at 229-30 (1977))).
187. See id. at 298 (requiring a showing that a group of boycotters possesses certain
1266
NO PENAL TY ON THE PLA Y
is the requirement that the boycotters must possess either "market power or
exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition."' Absent
these qualifications, the probability that the agreement's results will be
overwhelmingly anticompetitive is minimal.8 9 Because the per se rule affects
only agreements with obvious anticompetitive effects, the Court recognized that
refusals to deal will often warrant a rule of reason evaluation in order to
determine whether challenged conduct contains any procompetitive
justifications.' 90
This hesitancy in applying per se treatment to concerted action has
appeared consistently since Northwest Wholesale.'9' The following year, the
Court explained that "the category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not
to be expanded indiscriminately" as it reiterated the per se rule's limitations.'
92
The per se rule is now reserved for so-called "classic boycotts."' 93 Under this
approach, a concerted refusal to deal does not warrant per se treatment unless
the agreement meets Northwest Wholesale's preliminary requirements and the
experiences of the market allow a decisionmaker to draw a confident
conclusion about the agreement's anticompetitive effects.' 94 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit may have best articulated the new status of the
group boycott rule when it explained:
[O]ne must [recognize] that per se condemnation is not visited on every
arrangement that might, as a matter of language, be called a group boycott
or concerted refusal to deal.... We doubt that the modem Supreme Court
would use the boycott label to describe, or the rubric to condemn, a joint
venture among competitors in which participation was allowed to some but
characteristics before a court should consider applying the per se standard).
188. Id. at 296.
189. See id. at 295 ("Although a concerted refusal to deal need not necessarily possess all
of these traits to merit per se treatment, not every cooperative activity involving a restraint or
exclusion will share with the per se forbidden boycotts the likelihood of predominantly
anticompetitive consequences.").
190. See id. at 298 (noting that a rule of reason analysis is appropriate in some boycott
cases because "not all concerted refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive").
191. See, e.g., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 178, at 110 n.634 (listing
instances when courts refused to apply the per se standard to concerted conduct by competitors).
192. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986).
193. See ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 178, at Ill (noting that refusals to
deal are evaluated under the rule of reason unless they amount to a "classic boycott").
194. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999)
(explaining when the per se, quick look, and rule of reason standards are applicable).
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not all, although such a restriction might well fall after a more complete
analysis under the rule of reason. 
95
The current posture of group boycott jurisprudence, therefore, counsels
against summarily rejecting the BCS without considering any procompetitive
benefits it might offer consumers and the college football industry. The
Supreme Court's development of this issue indicates that a supposed boycott
warrants per se treatment only in the clearest of circumstances, 96 but the BCS
fails to fit neatly into the classic boycott model. 197 Indeed, a primary advocate
for per se condemnation is reduced to referring to the BCS as an "apparent
boycott ' 98 and to engaging in a series of questionable hypothetical situations to
confirm this characterization. 199 Simply calling conduct a boycott does not
expose it to per se treatment, 20° and the procompetitive justifications of the
BCS entitle it to more than categorical rejection by a decisionmaker.
195. United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593-94 (1 st Cir.
1993) (citation omitted).
196. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the per se rule is a "demanding standard" that is reserved only for "clear cut
cases").
197. As discussed in Part ll.D. I, the arrangement does not foreclose the opportunity of a
non-BCS conference school to play in one of the four BCS bowl games. See supra Part II.D. 1
(explaining that two of the eight available BCS slots are available to any Division I-A team).
198. Hales, supra note 170, at 115. A modified version of Mr. Hales's paper is available
on the Presidential Coalition for Athletics Reform's Internet site. Though the rhetoric in the
paper's title condemning the BCS is elevated in the online version, the characterization of the
agreement as an "apparent boycott" is consistent between the two drafts. See Mark Hales,
Antitrust Issues of the BCS: A Study of the Bowl Championship Series and Other Bowl
Associations That Have Led to a Decade ofBamboozle, Corruption, and Sham Within NCAA I-
A College Football, Part Ill.A, at http://www.geocities.com/byulawguy/BCSpaper.htm (last
visited June 19, 2004) ("The apparent boycott of non-BCS created by the BCS warrants per se
analysis.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
199. See Hales, supra note 170, at 115-16 (speculating that members of non-BCS
conferences would be prohibited from qualifying for a BCS game even if they played a
statistically competitive schedule). The article further posits that "a team is... barred from
National Championship consideration" if it is not ranked in the subjective AP or coaches' polls
in the preseason, an assumption that the author uses to bolster his argument that the BCS
deserves per se condemnation as an unlawful boycott. See id. at 117 (arguing for the application
of the per se rule against group boycotts to the BCS). As noted in Part II.D. l above, the BCS
accounts for each school's subjective rankings only at the conclusion of the regular season. See
supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (describing the "polls" variable in the BCS
formula). The preseason polls, therefore, are meaningless to the BCS and have no role in
determining which eight schools will participate in the four BCS bowl games.
200. See Mass. Sch. of Law v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 853 F. Supp. 837, 840 (E.D. Pa.) ("[M]erely
naming the practice a 'boycott'-and thus calling it a per se unlawful restraint-does not make
it so."), amended by 857 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997).
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This conclusion is enhanced by the treatment that challenged agreements
involving intercollegiate athletics traditionally receive. A frequently cited
decision for Sherman Act principles is National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,2°' in which the Court
evaluated an agreement that governed the football television broadcasting
rights of NCAA member schools.202 Though the Court struck down the
agreement, it refused to apply a per se analysis because horizontal restraints
were necessary in order for intercollegiate athletics to exist.203 Only a
thorough rule of reason examination suffices when evaluating such a
situation, the Court explained, and judicial decisionmakers must consider any
procompetitive justifications for the restrictions, such as increased efficiency
or the creation of a new product.2 a  Courts considering challenges to
201. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85
(1984). In Board of Regents, the Court considered whether a plan adopted by the NCAA that
limited the number of football games that any one member college could televise violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 91-98. The Tenth Circuit terminated the plan as a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 97-98. The Court disagreed with this analysis, however,
and felt that per se treatment was not justified in this case. Id. at 99-104. Instead, the plan
deserved a thorough rule of reason evaluation because it governed part of"an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all." Id. at
101. The Court explained that sports leagues, such as intercollegiate athletics under the NCAA,
required agreements among competitors in order to create the desired product or service. Id. at
101-02. Likewise, prior cases supported abandoning the per se rule when horizontal restraints
may enhance overall market efficiency and competition. Id. at 103 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977)). Application of the rule of reason did not salvage the plan, as it
restrained competition by fixing prices for particular telecasts, constituted a potential boycott of
competitors, and placed an artificial limit on the production of televised college football. Id. at
104-13. The NCAA attempted tojustify the plan by explaining that it was designed to assist in
the marketing of broadcast rights and to protect live attendance at football games. Id. at 113-
17. These procompetitive reasons were unpersuasive, though, because they relied on an overly
broad definition of the relevant market and were contrary to the findings of the district court that
the plan created no competition-enhancing efficiencies. Id. at 113-17. The NCAA also argued
that the plan was necessary to maintain a competitive balance in college football. Id. at 117-18.
Again, the Court rejected this procompetitive justification, noting that the plan only restricted
one source of football-related revenue available to a school and did not regulate the amount of
money a school may invest in its football program. Id. at 119. Because the NCAA could not
offer any persuasive procompetitive justifications for restricting the broadcasting rights of its
members, the plan violated Section I. Id. at 120.
202. See id. at 111-20 (finding that NCAA-imposed restrictions on the television
broadcasting rights of its member institutions violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act under a
rule of reason analysis).
203. See id. at 101-03 (explaining that certain industries require agreements among
competing firms in order to produce their respective goods and services and, therefore, per se
treatment was inappropriate).
204. See id. (discussing justifications for horizontal restraints among competitors).
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horizontal restraints in intercollegiate athletics since Board of Regents have
uniformly applied the rule of reason and evaluated the procompetitive
benefits such agreements might include.0 5
When this reluctance to apply per se rules against restrictions in college
athletics is coupled with the difficulty of placing the BCS into the prohibited
classic boycott model, it is clear that application of a per se standard is
inappropriate for evaluating the horizontal aspects of the agreement. 0 6
Instead, they deserve a thorough rule of reason analysis, weighing their
competitive benefits against their anticompetitive aspects, in order to
determine whether they violate Section 1. The gravamen of this examination
is the reasonableness of the BCS restrictions when considered against the
historical background in which they were developed.0 7
IV. Evaluating the Competitive Effects of the Bowl Championship Series
A. Alleged Anticompetitive Effects
The initial step in determining whether the BCS is a reasonable restraint is
to determine if it has a substantially adverse effect on competition. 20 8 Those
205. See, e.g., Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying a rule of reason analysis to a Section 1 challenge of a rule governing when collegiate
athletes may transfer from one school to another); Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134
F.3d 1010, 1018-19 (10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to apply per se treatment when evaluating an
NCAA restriction on the annual compensation of certain college basketball coaches); Hairston
v. Pac. Ten Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (using the rule of reason to
dismiss a Section I claim against a Division I-A conference's restrictions concerning the
recruitment of student-athletes); Ass'n of Indep. Television Stations v. Coll. Football Ass'n, 637
F. Supp. 1289, 1296-99 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (explaining that the rule of reason is the appropriate
analytical tool when evaluating an agreement among several college football programs to
broadcast their respective games only on certain television networks).
206. The quick look likewise should be dismissed for similar reasons. As explained, this
methodology is appropriate only when the anticompetitive effects of an arrangement are clear.
See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (discussing when the quick look should be
used). The supposed anticompetitive effects of the BCS, though, are not straightforward. See
infra Part IV.A (listing the anticompetitive effects of the BCS proffered by the Presidential
Coalition). The teachings of California Dental and Board of Regents also guide the
examination of the BCS to the rule of reason. See supra notes 161-68, 201-05 and
accompanying text (rejecting per se treatment).
207. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85, 98 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly recognized [that] the Sherman Act was intended to
prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade."); United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229,
237-38 (2d Cir. 2003) ("For over 100 years, the courts have understood the Sherman Act only
to prohibit 'unreasonable' restraints on trade.").
208. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998)
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within the Presidential Coalition argue that the financial distribution scheme of
the BCS destroys the competitive process within Division I-A, the relevant
market for the antitrust analysis. 209 Indeed, the group and its supporters often
cite the differences in revenue distribution between BCS and non-BCS
conferences alone as proof of an antitrust violation.2 1  The Presidential
Coalition claims that this disparity damages its members' football programs to
such an extent that they cannot adequately recruit the student-athletes or
coaches needed to compete in Division I-A football.2" It further posits that the
BCS scheme to determine a national champion augments these recruiting
difficulties because it is "virtually impossible for a non-BCS school to ever
qualify... for the national championship.2 12  Moreover, according to the
Presidential Coalition, the income disparity prevents schools that are not
members of a BCS-conference from improving their athletic facilities to the
same degree as those within the BCS, creating additional disadvantages in
recruiting players and coaches.213
In essence, the Presidential Coalition argues that significant funding and
the possibility of winning a championship are required to compete effectively in
college football. It contends that the BCS, with its procedures for distributing
revenue and determining which schools will participate in a national
championship game, forecloses the ability of non-BCS members to compete
meaningfully in college football. But President Cowen's testimony before the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives suggests otherwise. He
explained that schools from BCS conferences competed against those from
non-BCS conferences in the postseason sixteen times between 1998 and 2003;
each group won eight of these games.214 "That sounds competitive to me," he
(explaining that a plaintiff must show that an agreement has a significantly adverse impact on
competition under a rule of reason analysis).
209. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (discussing the supposed effect that the
BCS has had on schools that are not members of BCS-affiliated conferences).
210. See id. ("The financial disparity caused by the BCS can be described by merely stating
that the 63 BCS schools earned approximately $500 million since they began their first contract
five years ago, while the 53 Division I-A non-BCS schools shared earnings of $17 million.");
Cowen, Senate Statement, supra note 18 (discussing the significance of the disparity in BCS
revenue distribution).
211. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (explaining various adverse impacts that
the BCS has on the ability of schools that are not members of BCS conferences to compete).
212. Id.
213. See id. (noting that non-BCS schools are forced to "scramble within their own limited
budgets to fund [facility] improvements... or allow their facilities to be outpaced and fall
behind the competition").
214. See id. (describing recent occasions where BCS and non-BCS teams have played one
another in the postseason).
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boasted to the Committee.21 5 Based on this commentary, it would seem that the
Presidential Coalition agrees that the BCS actually does not disrupt the
competitive process of Division I-A college football. Harm to competition has
always been a necessary prerequisite to finding antitrust liability,216 so an
antitrust challenge may end without the BCS having to justify its conduct.
Assuming arguendo that the Presidential Coalition would satisfy its burden of
demonstrating that the BCS adversely affects competition, though, its
complaints are minor when compared to the procompetitive justifications for
the arrangement.
B. Procompetitive Benefits and Justifications of the Bowl
Championship Series
When a plaintiff satisfies its initial burden, the rule of reason analysis
requires a defendant to present procompetitive benefits and justifications for the
challenged conduct. 21 7 The BCS represents a significant step by the college
football industry toward enhancing its overall quality and harnessing the
economic benefits that its unique postseason structure creates. In order to fully
appreciate its procompetitive benefits and justifications, they will be discussed
in three sections. The first will discuss how the BCS bolsters competition
within Division I-A college football.2"8 This section is followed by a discussion
of how the BCS provides benefits and opportunities to those conferences that
are not BCS members.2 9 The final section describes a further procompetitive
justification for the BCS, namely the relatively low fan interest in non-BCS
conference teams.220
215. Id. At another point in his testimony, President Cowen asserted that, when non-BCS
teams play against BCS teams, "they are quite competitive." Id.
216. See Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 788 (6th Cir. 2002)
("The antitrust laws are intended to protect competition, not competitors.").
217. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the rule of reason gives a defendant the opportunity to justify an agreement to
restrain trade).
218. See infra Part IV.B.I (discussing benefits the BCS provides the college football
industry as a whole).
219. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining benefits that the BCS creates for non-BCS
conferences that were previously unavailable to these conferences).
220. See infra Part IV.B.3 (describing the undesirability of having non-BCS conference
members participate in a BCS bowl game from both a historical perspective and a fan's
perspective).
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1. Competitive Benefits to the Industry of College Football
Courts have discovered numerous procompetitive justifications for
221arrangements that are initially determined to harm competition. Creating a
new product, for instance, can justify an agreement that might otherwise
unreasonably restrain trade under Section 1.222 Generating a new product is the
very purpose of the BCS; the arrangement is designed to produce a national
championship game between Division I-A's two best teams at the conclusion of
each season.223 To be sure, the BCS system has successfully created a national
championship game in each of the six seasons in which it has been operative.
Beginning with the 1998 season, every Division I-A football national champion
has been victorious in a postseason game in which it was paired with the
nation's other top team.224 Prior to the inception of the BCS, though, such a
championship game occurred merely by coincidence, and these occasions were
rare indeed.225
Those opposed to the BCS argue that the arrangement actually fails to
produce a universally accepted national championship game, but this position
highlights the former system's incoherent method of selecting a champion.
Although the AP poll still crowns a national champion, it is not obligated to
select the winner of the BCS championship game for its title.226 The mischief
that the AP poll can cause as a result of its independence became clear during
the 2003-04 postseason. Critics claimed that the BCS failed to match up the
nation's two best teams for that season's championship game. 227 When the
221. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1023 (listing justifications for conduct that restrains trade).
222. See, e.g., Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1157 (9th Cir.
2003) (accepting the creation of a new product as ajustification for a restraint of trade); Law,
134 F.3d at 1023 (noting that generating a new product justifies a restraint of trade); Detroit
Auto Dealers Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 955 F.2d 457,475 (6th Cir. 1992) (considering the
creation of a new product as an enhancement to competition).
223. See supra Part II.D.I (discussing the methodology used by the BCS to produce a
national championship game).
224. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 171-72 (noting the bowl game in which each
national champion participated between the 1998 and 2003 seasons).
225. See supra Part II.C (explaining the inefficiencies in creating a national championship
game that prevailed prior to the BCS).
226. See Rick Alonzo, Coaches Follow System in Vote for No. /, DALLAS MoRNING NEws,
Jan. 6, 2004, at 4 (noting that the AP poll may choose a school that did not win the national
championship game as its overall champion). The coaches' poll, on the other hand, necessarily
elects the winner of the national championship game as the nation's best. See id. (explaining
that the American Football Coaches Association, the body that votes in the coaches' poll, has
agreed to deem the victor of the championship game as the national champion).
227. See Tim Griffin, LSU, USC Both Celebrate Their Crowning Moments, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEws, Jan. 6, 2004, at I D (discussing the contention that the University of Southern
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regular season concluded, the AP poll ranked the University of Southern
California as its number one team, with Louisiana State University second and
the University of Oklahoma third.228 The BCS formula, though, deemed
Louisiana State and Oklahoma as the nation's two best teams and paired them
to play for the national championship.229 Instead of agreeing that Louisiana
State, victor of the 2003-04 national championship game, was the nation's best
team, the AP poll defiantly proclaimed Southern California as its national
champion.230 These voters, as well as those who contend that the 2003-04
championship was split, fail to recognize that the BCS procedure for selecting
the country's best football team necessarily accounts for the AP poll.2 3 ' The
BCS formula absorbs the voters' opinions and limits the effect of their biases
and prejudices when determining which school has performed the best over the
course of a season.232 Simply put, there is only one legitimate college football
champion at the conclusion of each season, and it is the team that wins the
national championship game.
Minimizing the AP poll's importance in selecting a national champion
directly relates to a second procompetitive justification for the BCS. Courts
have reasoned that an improvement in product or service quality qualifies as a
procompetitive defense to an otherwise anticompetitive agreement.233 Despite
being a staple of Division I-A college football for over sixty years, sole reliance
on the polls created a sports league that often had no outright champion.234
Winning a championship, though, can generate incredible rewards for a
school.235 By purging the biases and inconsistencies that plagued the former
California should have participated in the 2003-04 national championship game),
228. See Bowl Championship Series, Final 2003 BCS Rankings, at http://sports.espn.
go.com/ncf/abcsports/BCSRankingsweek=-8 (Dec. 7,2003) [hereinafter BCS, Final Rankings]
(noting the AP poll's top three schools at the conclusion of the 2003-04 regular season) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
229. Id.
230. See Herb Gould, Split Decision Leaves BCS Reeling, CI. SUN-TIMEs, Jan. 6,2004, at
96 (explaining that the AP poll voted Southern California as the nation's best team despite
Louisiana State's victory in the national championship game).
23 1. See supra Part iI.D. I (explaining the role that the polls play in the BCS formula).
232. See supra Parts II.C, lID. I (discussing the prejudices that accompany the poll system
and explaining how the BCS formula accounts for the polls).
233. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998)
(listing procompetitive justifications for conduct that might otherwise be construed as
anticompetitive).
234. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining the split national championships
that occurred prior to the BCS).
235. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing the economic benefits of
winning a Division I-A championship).
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polls-only system from the determination of the nation's best teams, consumers
of college football-those who attend games and those who view games on
television or listen to them on the radio-have an objective and reliable
measure of each school's performance. a6 The BCS, in turn, uses this objective
evaluation as its primary input in producing the annual national championship
game and other BCS bowls.2 37 As such, the stability that accompanies the BCS
formula presents an upgrade from the arbitrary and inconsistent system
formerly used.
The factors used in the BCS formula themselves place a premium on
competition within the industry. Consider, for instance, the strength-of-
schedule variable. One-fifth of a school's BCS score depends on the quality of
its competition throughout the course of a season.238 Such weight induces
schools to play the strongest available opponents and encourages a higher level
of competition among all Division I-A participants. Under the BCS system, a
school can no longer win a championship by competing only against weaker
teams. Other variables generate similar competitive incentives. The BCS
punishes a team for losing at any point and rewards it for winning a game
against any of the nation's ten best teams.239 At its core, this formula demands
that each team play high-quality opponents and that it be victorious in these
games before it will be given the opportunity to capture the season's national
championship and the economic benefits that accompany it.240 Such guidelines
certainly advance the basic principles of competition within Division I-A
college football that the antitrust laws were designed to foster.
2. Benefits to Schools That Are Not Members of the Bowl
Championship Series
In addition to these industry-wide competitive justifications, the BCS
arrangement also generates specific benefits for schools that are not members of
236. See supra Part II.D. I (explaining the calculation used to determine which schools will
compete in BCS bowls).
237. See supra Part I.D.I (noting that the two schools with the lowest scores in the BCS
formula play one another to determine the national champion while explaining that the formula
is used to create the pool of teams eligible to participate in a BCS bowl game).
238. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (outlining the strength of schedule
component of the BCS formula).
239. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (describing the impact that losing a
game or defeating any of the top ten teams can have on a school's BCS score).
240. See supra Part II.D. I (explaining the purposes of the BCS formula's variables and
how the formula is designed to pair the two best teams at the conclusion of the season).
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a BCS conference. For instance, it provides these schools with a high level of
access to the BCS bowl games. Indeed, if a non-BCS team finishes the season
ranked among the top two in the BCS standings, it will necessarily compete for
the national championship. 24' The BCS structure also requires its bowls to fill
available at-large slots with non-BCS teams if they are ranked within the top six
in the final BCS standings.242 It provides no such protection for similarly
ranked BCS schools. Likewise, the pool of teams eligible for an at-large
position is restricted to only the twelve highest ranked schools at season's
end.243 This condition prevents the four bowls from arbitrarily bypassing a
highly-qualified team from outside of a BCS conference in favor of a less
deserving BCS member. Prior to the BCS arrangement, however, non-BCS
conference members rarely had the opportunity to compete in these postseason
games.
In the fifty years immediately preceding the BCS, the BCS bowls
collectively invited teams from non-BCS conferences to compete in their
244respective games fewer than ten times. In fact, only once in the final twenty
years under the former postseason system did a school from a non-BCS
conference play in any of these games. 245 This lack of inclusion was due in part
to the preseason agreements that conferences would enter into with bowls that
predetermined postseason match-ups. 246 When at-large positions remained
available, though, the four BCS bowls clearly were reluctant to include these
schools.247 The BCS framework mitigates this reluctance in favor of non-BCS
conference members and insists on their inclusion if they satisfy certain
conditions.
241. See POPPE, supra note 13, at 9 ("Any at-large team ranked No. 1 or No. 2 in the final
BCS standings shall play in the BCS national championship game.").
242. See id. (discussing how a non-BCS team can automatically qualify for a BCS bowl
game).
243. See id. at 8 (noting which teams may receive an at-large invitation to play in a BCS
game).
244. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 173-74 (listing the participants in the BCS
bowls since each game's inception). The Sugar Bowl hosted non-BCS schools on four
occasions between 1948 and 1998. Id. at 174. The Fiesta Bowl hosted three non-BCS schools,
while the Orange Bowl allowed only two non-BCS schools to compete during this same time
period. Id. at 173-74. The Rose Bowl did not invite a non-BCS team to participate in this time
period. Id. at 173.
245. This lone occasion occurred when the University of Louisville played in the Fiesta
Bowl following the 1990 regular season. Id.
246. See supra Part tl.B (explaining the relationships that conferences typically have with
bowl games).
247. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 173-74 (noting times in each BCS bowl's
history that one of its slots was available to an at-large participant).
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Despite these provisions, the Presidential Coalition contends that it is
"virtually impossible for a non-BCS school to ever qualify for a BCS bowl."
248
The 2003-04 football season shows the inaccuracy of this statement. For
example, the University of Miami of Ohio, which is not a member of a BCS
conference, finished that season ranked eleventh in the BCS standings,
qualifying it to compete in a BCS game.249  Likewise, Texas Christian
University, also a member of a non-BCS conference, spent part of the season
ranked among the top six. 250 Had the school been able to sustain its success,
the arrangement would have guaranteed Texas Christian a position in a BCS
game.251 No BCS bowl invited either of these schools to compete, but this
result was a function of the economic reality of consumer preferences and is not
attributable to the BCS structure.
252
Although a non-BCS team has never participated in a BCS game since the
arrangement's inception,2 3 the opportunity for these schools to be invited
certainly exists. Ultimately, it is this opportunity to compete that guides the
antitrust analysis. The Sherman Act is concerned with protecting competition
itself and not individual competitors. 54 The potential for any team to play in a
BCS game encourages competition within Division I-A football, and such
248. Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9.
249. BCS, Final Rankings, supra note 228.
250. See Bowl Championship Series, 2003 BCS Rankings, Week Four, at http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncf/abcsports/BCSRankings?week=4 (Nov. 10, 2003) (ranking Texas Christian
University as the nation's sixth best team after completion of the regular season's first two
months) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. See Tony Barnhart, Southern Miss Ends it for TCU, ATLANTA J.-CoNST., Nov. 21,
2003, at I H (discussing the impact that Texas Christian University's first loss in the 2003-04
regular season had on its eligibility to play in a BCS game). Texas Christian finished the season
ranked eighteenth in the BCS standings. BCS, Final Rankings, supra note 228. Its lower
ranking was primarily the result of a weak level of competition, as its strength of schedule was
in the lowest quartile. See id. (noting that the difficulty of Texas Christian's schedule was
ranked 95th out of 117). This low level of competition prompted some commentators to
question whether the school deserved to play in a BCS bowl regardless of its position in the
BCS rankings. See, e.g., Phil Taylor, They're Not Princes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 3, 2003,
at 89 (criticizing the quality of Texas Christian's opposition).
252. See infra Part IV.B.3 (explaining that consumers substantially prefer to watch schools
from BCS conferences compete than watching teams from non-BCS conferences).
253. See SPORTS ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 173-74 (listing the participants in each BCS
game since 1998).
254. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) ("It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for 'the protection of competition,
not competitors."' (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))).
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competitive opportunities for all members of an industry are precisely what the
antitrust laws prescribe. 5
Regardless of whether a non-BCS conference is represented in a BCS
bowl, it receives a monetary award from the revenue created by the
arrangement. 256  This additional procompetitive benefit to non-BCS
conferences is straightforward: These conferences necessarily profit from the
BCS irrespective of their involvement in the postseason. Despite not being
represented in a BCS bowl since the arrangement became effective, non-BCS
conferences have received over $20 million of BCS-generated revenue during
this time period.257 Conferences may disperse these funds in any way they
choose, but a rational conference would invest this money in a manner that
would increase its members' abilities to compete on the football field. 258 A
higher level of football success, in turn, can lead to substantial economic
benefits. 259 By presenting financial resources to non-BCS conferences that can
be invested in their members' programs, the BCS framework supports this
competitive incentive.
3. Consumer Preferences: An Additional Consideration for the
Reasonableness of the Bowl Championship Series
Beyond these procompetitive benefits, the BCS is also a reasonable
arrangement when considered in light of the preferences of college football
consumers. Consumer preference is a dominant factor when analyzing the
reasonableness of a restraint, and an agreement may be considered
unreasonable if it does not adhere to known customer tastes. 260 The
255. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 294-96 (1985) (explaining that arrangements tend not to be unreasonable if they do not
deny competitors access to competitive opportunities).
256. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (describing how BCS revenue is
distributed among all Division I-A conferences).
257. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (noting that the BCS distributed
approximately $17 million among non-BCS conferences in its first five years); BCS, Revenue
Distribution, supra note 123 (listing the amount of BCS-created revenue that each non-BCS
conference received following the 2003-04 postseason). The BCS projects that it will distribute
more than $42 million to non-BCS conferences during the arrangement's first eight years. Id.
258. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing the revenue-sharing plans that
many conferences have adopted in order to increase the quality of their respective members'
teams).
259. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining the financial rewards that
accompany successful football seasons).
260. See Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1101 (I st Cir. 1994) (noting that
"Itfhe Supreme Court has emphasized ... that overall consumer preferences in setting output
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Presidential Coalition asserts that observers of college football would be quite
interested in seeing two non-BCS teams compete in the premier postseason
games, 26 but this position is empirically untenable. An examination of each
school's live attendance data from the 2003-04 college football season, a
reasonable indicator of consumer preferences with regards to college football
"consumption, 2 62 demonstrates the inaccuracy of the Presidential Coalition's
hypothesis.263
During the 2003-04 college football season, members of BCS conferences
averaged over 60,000 fans at each regular season game that they hosted.26
Schools that are not members of a BCS conference, though, drew less than
25,000 to each home game. The difference in these averages is clearly
substantial.265 The comparison might be a bit unfair, though, given that some
and prices is more important than higher prices and lower output,per se, in determining whether
there has been an injury to competition" and explaining that a restraint that makes a relevant
market unresponsive to these preferences is unreasonable).
261. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (positing that the BCS "might be
surprised" at the interest that non-BCS conference football teams could create in the BCS bowl
games).
262. Because admission into a college football game is not free, live attendance data
indicates in which schools consumers are willing to invest their limited financial resources. A
dollar spent to watch one school compete assumes that a rational consumer could not have
derived more satisfaction out of spending that same dollar to watch a different school play
football. Live attendance data, therefore, is used in this Note to sort the preferences of rational
consumers of college football.
263. The figures used for this analysis are published by the NCAA. See Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 2003 NCAA College Football Attendance 4-6, at http://www.ncaa.org/stats/
football/attendance/2003/2003footballattendance.pdf (Jan. 30,2004) [hereinafter NCAA, 2003
Attendance] (listing the average attendance for regular season football games at each Division I-
A school) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The sample includes all 117
Division I-A football programs that participated in the 2003-04 season. Id. at 4. The mean
attendance at a Division I-A game during the 2003-04 regular season was 44,877 spectators.
Id. at I.
264. This sample includes all BCS conference members and the University of Notre Dame
because of its affiliation with the BCS. See supra note 102 (explaining that the University of
Notre Dame was an initial signatory to the BCS arrangement). The author calculated this
reported average value and all those that follow in the remainder of Part IV.B.3.
265. A t-test was performed on these values to determine if the difference in these averages
was statistically significant. This statistical test is used to determine if a simple correlation
exists between two variables. A.H. STUDENMUND, USING ECONOMETRICS: A PRAcTICALGUIDE
606 (4th ed. 2001). The test provides a t-value that can be compared with critical values of the
t-distribution in order to determine whether two variables are highly correlated. Id. For a table
of these critical values, see RAMU RAMANATHAN, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS WITH
APPLICATIONS A-3 (4th ed. 1998). The calculated t-value for this comparison is 11. 14 with 115
degrees of freedom, rendering the difference in these averages statistically significant at the .00 I
level. This indicates that one can be certain, with 99.9% confidence, that the two values are
functionally distinct from one another. Put differently, one can be 99.9% certain that there is a
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BCS conference members have football stadiums capable of holding 100,000
spectators or more.266 In order to provide an arguably more reasonable
comparison, suppose that the data of all BCS schools with stadiums that hold
more than 80,000 observers is discarded from the sample.267 The average
attendance of this truncated sample still exceeds 50,000, and the difference in
this value and the average attendance at games hosted by members ofnon-BCS
conferences remains statistically significant to a high degree. 268 The upshot of
this is that one can reject, with unqualified certainty, the Presidential
Coalition's assertion that consumers equally desire to watch BCS and non-BCS
conference members.
Such a conclusion, however, does not require the use of sophisticated
statistical tools. Even a cursory inspection of the attendance figures for each
conference reveals distinct differences between consumer interest in football
programs of schools that are in BCS conferences and consumer interest in those
that are not. During the 2003-04 regular season, each of the six BCS
conferences surpassed its own prior record for average attendance per game.
269
All of these conferences also saw an increase in average attendance from the
previous season's figures. 270 Conversely, the five non-BCS conferences did not
experience similar record-setting attendance rates, and, in fact, two suffered a
decline in average attendance.27' It is straightforward, therefore, that
consumers of college football prefer watching schools that are members of BCS
conferences compete during the regular season significantly more than they
prefer watching those that are not.
When college football transitions from its regular season into the
postseason, fan interest remains overwhelmingly with schools that are members
of BCS conferences. Like live attendance figures, television ratings may serve
significant difference between consumer preferences for attending games hosted by BCS teams
and for attending those hosted by non-BCS teams.
266. The respective stadiums of the Universities of Michigan, Penn State, Tennessee, and
Ohio State all seat over 100,000 spectators. NCAA, 2003 Attendance, supra note 263, at 4.
267. The dataset loses 14 observations when this subset is removed, leaving a sample size
of 48 BCS conference schools. The decision to eliminate all observations with an average
attendance of 80,000 or more was done to create a sample size that is more closely comparable
to the subset of schools that are not in BCS conferences, or 55 schools.
268. The calculated t-value for this comparison is 10.82 with 101 degrees of freedom, also
rendering the difference in these averages statistically significant at the .001 level.
269. See NCAA, 2003 Attendance, supra note 263, at I (noting which conferences set their
respective records in average attendance during the 2003-04 season).
270. Id.
271. See id. (noting that only Conference USA and the Sun Belt Conference established
new conference attendance records while average attendance figures in the Mountain West and
Western Athletic Conferences declined from the previous year).
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as a reasonable indicator of consumer tastes for consumption of different
football teams, 272 and an examination of the data from the 2002-03 and 2003-
04 postseasons reveals the same preferences as the above discussion.273 The
average television rating for a bowl game that involved participants exclusively
from non-BCS conferences is 2.03. Bowl games that included only schools
from BCS conferences, on the other hand, enjoy average ratings of 5.66.274
Some might consider such a comparison misleading, however, because the
latter value includes two national championship games that can upwardly skew
272. The basis for using television ratings as a proxy for consumer preferences mirrors that
of the live attendance data. Time spent watching a particular bowl game on television assumes
that a rational consumer would not derive a higher level of satisfaction out of watching a
different television program or engaging in a different activity. This Note uses television
ratings, like live attendance figures, to sort the preferences of rational college football
consumers.
273. The television ratings used for this analysis are published by Nielsen Media Research
and are made available by the BCS. See Bowl Championship Series, 2003-04 BCS Bowl TV
Ratings and Attendance, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/ratings04.shtml (last visited June 19,
2004) (listing the television rating for each bowl game during the 2003-04 postseason) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Bowl Championship Series, 2002-03 Bowl Game
TVRatings, at http://www.bcsfootball.org/ratings.shtml (last visited June 19,2004) [hereinafter
BCS, 2002-03 Ratings] (listing the television rating for each bowl game during the 2002-03
postseason) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The ratings indicate the
percentage of all United States households with television sets that tuned into a particular bowl
game. See BCS, 2002-03 Ratings (explaining the television rating system). Each rating point
equals a percentage point of all households with televisions that watched a particular bowl. Id.
The sample includes 56 observations. The average rating for all 2002-03 bowl games is 4.24,
while the average rating for all 2003-04 bowl games is slightly lower at 4.19.
Television ratings capture more than just consumer preferences for BCS and non-BCS
teams. For example, ratings might be a function of the date on which a game occurs, or they
may reflect the time of day in which a game aired on television. In order to evaluate the role
that the BCS and non-BCS distinction played in the ratings, the author performed an ordinary
least squares regression analysis with this dataset. Such an analysis can determine the singular
impact that an independent variable can have on a dependent variable. See SumeMUND, supra
note 265, at 34-62 (explaining uses of an ordinary least squares model). In the regression, the
television ratings for a non-BCS bowl game served as the dependent variable. The independent
variables accounted for whether only BCS or non-BCS teams played in the bowl, whether the
bowl occurred within one day of a holiday (that is, between December 24 and 26 or between
December 31 and January 2), and whether the game aired during the prime television viewing
hours in the Eastern Standard Time Zone. The results of the analysis indicated that the only
independent variable that impacted television ratings to a high level of statistical significance
was whether the game consisted of only BCS or non-BCS teams. As such, it is appropriate to
use this set of television ratings as a proxy for consumer preferences of games involving BCS
teams and of games involving non-BCS teams. For a detailed explanation of the regression
model, please contact the author.
274. This comparison contains 44 observations. The difference in these respective means
is statistically significant to a level of .01, or 99% confidence, with a t-value of 2.76 and 42
degrees of freedom.
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the sample's average. 75 Instead, a more appropriate test of the Presidential
Coalition's hypothesis may be to compare the average rating of non-BCS bowl
games that only consisted of non-BCS conference teams against the average
rating ofnon-BCS bowl games that included only BCS conference teams. The
mean rating for all non-BCS bowls that showcased only BCS conference
schools remains relatively high, though, at 3.83% of all households with
televisions. The difference in these averages is also statistically significant to
such an extent that one can reject, again with unqualified certainty, the
Presidential Coalition's contention that consumers of postseason college
football desire to watch BCS and non-BCS conference members with equal
enthusiasm.276
The import of this analysis is that the BCS arrangement guarantees
representation in its bowl games to those conferences and schools that
consumers prefer to watch compete. The BCS, therefore, not only creates a
critical new product within the industry, but it creates a product for which a
relatively large amount of demand exists. Moreover, it accomplishes this
without foreclosing the opportunity for non-BCS teams to compete in BCS
bowl games if consumer preferences change. This consideration, along with
those stated above in Parts IV.B. 1 and 2, shifts the burden of persuasion back to
the Presidential Coalition to prove that all of these objectives can be satisfied
through substantially less-restrictive means, 277 a burden it will not be able to
satisfy.
C. Dismissing Less-Restrictive Alternatives to the Bowl
Championship Series
The third prong of a rule of reason analysis investigates whether the
objectives sought by a challenged restraint can be met through less restrictive
means. 27 This evaluation does-not require a restraint to be the least restrictive
means of achieving its stated objectives but instead turns on whether the
conduct is reasonably necessary to accomplish the desired procompetitive
275. The average rating for the eight BCS games in the sample is 11.84.
276. With a t-value of 3.72 and 34 degrees of freedom, the difference in these averages is
statistically significant to a level of.001, or 99.9% confidence.
277. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that, if a defendant presents procompetitive justifications for its conduct, a plaintiff
must show that these justifications can be achieved in a "substantially less restrictive manner" in
order to sustain an antitrust challenge).
278. See id. (noting that this step is the final one in a rule of reason evaluation prior to
weighing the procompetitive benefits against any anticompetitive effects).
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benefits.21 9 Opponents of the BCS suggest that Division I-A football replace
the postseason bowls with a playoff system, arguing that this would be more
inclusive of non-BCS conference members.280 While a playoff would create a
national champion, it would not be able to do so without destroying two
primary objectives of the BCS.
A basic tenet of the BCS is that it blends its bundle of procompetitive
effects with existing bowl games in an effort both to advance the industry
and to remain faithful to its history.28' Indeed, the bowl game tradition is a
defining characteristic of Division I-A football that many within the
industry forcefully defend.28 2 Rejecting the bowl game system in favor of a
playoff format would abolish a feature of college football that the industry
wishes to produce and that consumers of football desire.28 3
The BCS is also distinguishable from a playoff format in its method of
choosing a national champion. A hallmark of the BCS is that it places a
premium on success over the course of an entire season.284  The BCS
formula accounts for the aggregate quality of a school's opposition as well
as whether it defeated a top-notch team or lost a game at any point during
the season.285 Under the BCS framework, losing once can be crippling to a
team's chances of winning a championship, twice fatal.2 8 6  A playoff
279. See id. (explaining that a plaintiff must show that the "challenged conduct is not
reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives"); Nat'l Bancard Corp. v. Visa,
U.S.A., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1256-57 (S.D. Fla. 1984) ("It should be stressed ... that in making
this determination, the relevant question is not whether the challenged practice is the most
competitive device that can be imagined, or the 'least restrictive,' but simply whether it is
reasonable."), affd 779 F.2d 592 (11 th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original).
280. See Cowen, House Statement, supra note 9 (advocating either an eight-team or
sixteen-team playoff format to replace the bowl system); see also Hales, supra note 170, at 126-
29 (suggesting a playoff system as well as a new method of ranking Division I-A teams).
281. See supra Parts II.A, II.D. I (explaining the traditional bowl system and how the BCS
integrates this system into its structure).
282. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalent desire to maintain
the bowl system).
283. Assuming that the market for bowl games has acted rationally, the number of bowls
has expanded within the past fifteen years in order to meet consumer demand for the products.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (noting that the number of bowl games has
increased greatly in recent years). The demand for bowls is so great that some states are
planning to create new games despite limited funding for other social programs. See, e.g.,
Bauerlein, supra note 52, at AI (noting that South Carolina is exploring the formation of a new
bowl game despite facing "the tightest state budget in memory").
284. See supra Part II.D. I (explaining the methodology used by the BCS when determining
the participants in national championship game).
285. See supra Part l.D. I (discussing the factors that comprise the BCS formula used to
establish a national championship game).
286. See SPoRTS ALMANAc, supra note 48, at 171-72 (noting that no team has played fora
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format, on the other hand, would diminish the importance of winning every
regular season game. Instead of motivating teams to win as much as
possible, this system would create an incentive to win only as many games
as necessary to be included in the playoff.1 7 After a team achieves the
minimum number of victories required to ensure its spot in the playoff, it
can withhold its competitive resources until the postseason begins. For
instance, a team in this position might choose to use only backup players in
its remaining regular season games, or it may decide not to develop any
new strategies or plays until the regular season concludes. The antitrust
laws surely were not intended to strike a system that encourages vigorous
competition at all times in favor of one that creates a less competitive
atmosphere within an industry.
A final consideration that counsels against a playoff format involves
the organization and administration of this system. Such an undertaking
almost certainly would require the inclusion of the NCAA, a party that
currently has a limited role in the Division I-A postseason,2 8 because of the
vast administrative tasks associated with conducting a playoff, including
hiring officials to referee games, providing security, and inspecting game
sites. The organization, though, does not oversee a championship for this
division,2 89 nor does it desire to accept such a task. 90 It would be
imprudent for a court to insist that a nonparty to an antitrust challenge
burden itself with overwhelming responsibilities. For these reasons, a
plaintiff challenging the BCS would be unable to show that a playoff
system could achieve the same procompetitive objectives as the BCS in a
less restrictive fashion.
national championship with more than one regular season loss since the BCS became effective).
287. The concept of not maximizing one's potential, but instead only attaining a certain
level of success, is known as "satisficing." See Herbert A. Simon, Theories ofDecision-Making
in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REv. 253, 263 (1959) (explaining that a
firm "satisfices" when its goals include "attaining a certain level or rate of profit, holding a
certain share of the market, or a certain level of sales" instead of profit-maximization).
288. See POPPE, supra note 13, at 31-37 (explaining that the NCAA's role in the
postseason is primarily to certify bowl games).
289. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (explaining that the absence of an
NCAA-recognized champion is one of Division I-A's distinguishing characteristics).
290. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that the NCAA has rejected
proposals to administer a national championship tournament for Division I-A football on three
separate occasions); see also Brand, Senate Statement, supra note 58 (describing the
undesirability of a playoff format for Division -A's postseason due to the tradition of the bowl
system).
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D. Weighing the Competitive Effects of the Bowl Championship Series
If a restraint proves to be reasonably necessary to achieve its procompetitive
objectives, then a factfinder must balance the pro- and anticompetitive effects
against one another.2 91 The Supreme Court has given relatively little guidance as to
how this balancing should take place. 92 In the case of the BCS, though, this lack of
direction is of no consequence. When one considers the procompetitive benefits
that the arrangement provides to the industry as a whole and to the non-BCS
conferences themselves, it is almost tautological to say that the BCS enhances
overall competition. The fact that the BCS is in harmony with consumer
preferences furthers its reasonableness. When, as here, an arrangement creates
procompetitive effects that are substantial and critical to the quality of a market, it
receives the Sherman Act's blessing.293
This conclusion does not leave members of the Presidential Coalition without
recourse. As with a business and its production processes, a school can improve the
efficiency of its football program in order to maximize the utility of resources that it
devotes to the sport. A school may also shift its NCAA affiliation from Division I-
A to a different division that requires a smaller financial commitment to football.2 94
As a final measure, a school may elect to end its football program altogether in favor
of distributing its resources to other parts of the university, such as the academic
sector.295 Challenging the BCS as a violation of the Sherman Act, however, would
be a fruitless use of these resources.
V. Conclusions
For many universities, football is of paramount importance.2 96 Alumni may
demand a competitive program, students often seek to participate on a football team,
291. See Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998)
(noting how the antitrust analysis proceeds if a plaintiff cannot show that a restraint is not
reasonably necessary to achieving its procompetitive goals).
292. See ArriTRusT LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 178, at 77 (explaining issues that
arise in the balancing phase of an antitrust challenge that the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed).
293. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that a restraint is permissible if it is shown to
be reasonable under the rule of reason).
294. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (explaining that Division I-A requires
the largest devotion of resources to football).
295. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing some schools that ended their
football programs in order to conserve financial resources).
296. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 7G (noting that athletic teams, such as football, are
"probably the single greatest unifying factor among alumni and supporters" at many
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and other sports and academic programs rely on revenue created by a successful
football program. 297 Despite the potential monetary gains football can bring, it can
also be a financial burden.29 Participating in a postseason bowl game, especially in
one of the premier BCS bowls, can relieve this budgetary strain.299
Schools that attribute their financial difficulties to supposed antitrust violations
by the BCS are mistaken. Not only does the BCS distribute funds to all Division I-
A conferences regardless of their participation in a BCS game, it also provides every
Division I-A school with an opportunity to become the national champion.300 An
antitrust challenge of the BCS would likely prove unsuccessful because the
arrangement marries the traditions of college football's postseason with an
efficiency-enhancing objective measurement of each school's abilities in order to
produce a national championship competition that was previously unavailable.30'
Instead of harming competition, the arrangement provides competitive incentives
for all Division I-A teams. 302 Schools that do not compete aggressively simply will
not be rewarded with the economic benefits that the BCS can provide, and the
Sherman Act is neither a crutch to support less efficient and productive football




297. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (describing the role of a football program
in the university setting).
298. See supra notes 8-1 and accompanying text (discussing the financial difficulties that
supporting a football program can create for a school).
299. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (noting the huge revenues created by
the BCS that are dispersed to participants).
300. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing benefits that the BCS provides to non-BCS
conference members).
301. See supra Parts II.C-D (explaining the inefficiencies of college football, including the
absence of a national championship game, cured by the BCS).
302. See supra Part IV.B. I (describing the benefits to competition within college football
created by the BCS).
303. See Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003)
("Inefficiency is precisely what the market aims to weed out. The Sherman Act, to put it
bluntly, contemplates some roadkill on the turnpike to Efficiencyville.").
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